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“The essence of a customary rule lies in the fact that it arises 
from the conduct of those whom it binds.”1 
 
“[O]bedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is lib-
erty.”2 
 
“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of gov-
ernment.”3 
INTRODUCTION 
The traditional narrative of international law is familiar: states are 
sovereign, enjoy a monopoly on legal personality under international 
law, and make international law. This traditional narrative, at one time 
accepted as true, is now inaccurate on every count. 
The traditional doctrine of customary international law (CIL) is also 
well known: it is made up of state practice and opinio juris. This state-
centric account is also wrong, both factually and normatively. Until re-
cently, the recognition that actors other than states participate in cus-
tomary international law has been confined to the observation of legal 
realists. The role of non-state actors in the formation of CIL has not 
been adequately considered or explored despite vital questions that arise 
from the realists’ observations. These questions fall essentially into two 
categories. First, what effects would a doctrinal re-ordering that recog-
nized a role for individuals in CIL formation have on international law 
generally, and on human rights and CIL in particular? Second, if it is 
conceded that general international law, human rights, and CIL call for 
and can accommodate breaking the monopoly power states hold on CIL 
                                                          
1. Michel Virally, The Sources of International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 116, 130 (Max Sørensen ed., 1968). 
2. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 178 (G.D.H. Cole 
trans., J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1973) (1762). 
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st 
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
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formation, how would individuals participate? This Article will seek to 
address these questions. 
Many discussions of CIL start, either conceptually or chronologi-
cally, with the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Of course, 
custom was part of customary international law long before the Statute 
was adopted. Taking just one step back in time, for example, one can 
note that the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (the 
predecessor to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)) included text 
identical to that of the Statute of the ICJ in respect to CIL.4 Going back 
further in time, one finds familiar, if somewhat dated, definitions of cus-
tom in early international law treatises.5 
In these earlier periods, theorizing about the relationship of custom to 
law was well underway in legal scholarship and other areas. This deeper 
theorization on customary law made clear that one of its legitimizing 
premises was that it was thought to originate in the actions and beliefs 
of those whom it later comes to bind – the subjects of the law.6 The be-
lief that customary law originates from its subjects seems to have been 
translated directly into international legal doctrine. From the time cus-
tom was first identified as a source of international law until the fairly 
recent re-conceptualization and expansion of the subjects of interna-
tional law,7 states have been the only entities recognized as subjects of 
international law.8 Thus, it was consistent to define CIL as law that was 
made from the acts and beliefs of states alone. Currently, however, indi-
viduals are widely recognized as subjects of international law.9 One 
question that arises logically from this recognition is its effect on the 
power of individuals to make international law, and specifically on their 
power to participate in the formation of CIL. 
                                                          
4. For a narrative discussion of the process by which Article 38 of the Statute of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice was adopted into the Statute of the ICJ, see THE STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 689–690 (Andreas Zimmermann et 
al. eds., 2006).  
5. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS 
OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 62 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1876) (1758); L. 
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 25–26 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948). 
6. GILBERT T. SADLER, THE RELATION OF CUSTOM TO LAW 9 (1919). 
7. See infra Section III.A.1.  
8. Some commentators have argued that this view of international law has always been op-
posed and has always been unrealistic. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, JON M. VAN DYKE, LINDA A. 
MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 14 (2005). Thank you to Jordan 
Paust for this and many other valuable comments. 
9. See infra Section III.A.1. 
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Among the many authors who have discussed the problems inherent 
in the doctrine on the formation of CIL, many seem to have considered 
or briefly touched upon the prospect of individuals formally participat-
ing in CIL formation. None, however, have delved deeply into the pos-
sibility. This Article aims to do just that. 
This Article will contribute to at least three strains of international 
law literature. First, and perhaps most obviously, it will contribute to the 
current understanding of CIL generally and CIL formation more spe-
cifically. As the Article will demonstrate, few theorists have made ex-
plicit the possibility that individuals could or should participate in CIL 
formation. CIL literature often skirts the edge of this possibility, even if 
it does not address it directly. 
Second, the Article will address the existing literature on the individ-
ual as a subject of international law. The establishment of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) caused 
commentators to take notice of a palpable expansion in the types of sub-
jects of international law. At that time, scholars noted that individuals 
might be taking on a role as subjects of international law, as they were 
gaining enforceable rights and obligations under international law. In 
the intervening years, this idea has gained acceptance and legitimacy, 
especially as an increasing number of human rights treaties have in-
cluded provisions granting individuals the right to personally seek re-
dress10 and as various tribunals have provided avenues for individuals to 
make legal claims based on violations of their human rights as estab-
lished in international law.11 In addition, the development of theories of 
individual responsibility for violations of international law, whether in 
the human rights or humanitarian law arenas, provides further evidence 
of individuals becoming subjects of international law. A relatively novel 
idea, however, is the potentially corresponding notion that individuals 
should be makers of international law. This Article will discuss impor-
tant writings on the individual as the subject of international law in or-
                                                          
10. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/text.htm. Further examples can be found in 
Section III.A.3 herein. 
11. One example is the use of U.S. federal courts as a forum for addressing violations of the 
“law of nations” through modern Alien Tort Statute litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Fur-
ther examples can be found in Section III.A.3 herein. 
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der to establish the groundwork for a relatively modest assertion of lib-
eral democratic theory—that people ought to participate in making the 
law that governs and protects them.12 
Finally, this Article will contribute to the literature on the participa-
tion of private actors in the international law-making process. Existing 
work has primarily described the increasing prominence of private ac-
tors, in the form of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or civil so-
ciety, in the work of international institutions and in the norm and treaty 
formation process. This growing body of literature has not yet turned 
squarely to the role individuals might have in forming CIL, despite 
CIL’s relevance in governing and protecting individuals.13 
Part I of this Article will begin by establishing preliminary terminol-
ogy relevant to the discussion of the formation of CIL. It will then 
briefly discuss historical and contemporary CIL doctrine, as well as cri-
tiques thereof. Readers well-versed in CIL literature will find this por-
tion of the Article familiar. 
Part II will illustrate that others writing about CIL, especially as it re-
lates to human rights, have not addressed fully the difficulties created by 
the exclusion of individuals from CIL formation. This Part will describe 
three strands of foundational literature. The first consists of writings that 
have specifically identified the possibility of individuals participating in 
CIL formation but that have looked on the possibility with skepticism. 
The second strand provides examples of a much wider body of work 
that alludes to the possibility of including individuals in CIL formation 
without directly addressing this prospect. The third strand is made up of 
work that looks upon individuals participating in CIL formation from 
either a realistic perspective or from an optimistic perspective and leads 
the current author to believe that individuals do participate in CIL for-
mation and, further, that a formalized and doctrinal role for such par-
ticipation should be established. 
Parts III and IV describe the theoretical basis for including the indi-
vidual in CIL formation. Part III establishes a foundation for this con-
                                                          
12. ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 178.  
13. See Anthony D’Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea 
for Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 71 (1995–1996) (arguing for new au-
thors to approach CIL from a different perspective). 
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cept in international legal doctrine generally, and specifically in the ar-
eas of human rights and CIL. Part IV looks beyond legal doctrine and 
into literature on globalization and the attendant emergence of cos-
mopolitanism and transnationalism. It seeks to establish that large-scale, 
observable social phenomena have changed the fundamental landscape 
on which the law-making doctrine of international law is based. 
Finally, in Part V, the Article will discuss the practical aspects of 
formally recognizing individuals in the formation of CIL. This discus-
sion will focus on two questions. The first asks whether the inclusion of 
individuals requires the Statute of the ICJ to be re-drafted and whether 
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States would 
require new wording in its next incarnation or whether the current texts 
would allow (or reflect) such a possibility. The second asks how the be-
liefs and expectations of individuals might be discovered such that fu-
ture adjudicators and scholars aiming to determine the content of CIL 
might include individuals in their analytical and deliberative processes. 
I. BUILDING BLOCKS: TERMINOLOGY AND DOCTRINE 
A. Preliminary Terminology: Usage, Custom, Customary Law, 
International Custom 
An inquiry into the formative process of customary international law 
asks how we make determinations of what behavior has become so 
commonplace or commonly accepted that a trespass against that com-
monality is believed to be admonishable by law. Along the road to be-
coming law, behavior may pass through various other characterizations 
describing its ubiquity, or lack thereof, in society as well as the attitudes 
of a social group towards that behavior. The behavior may become a 
common practice or usage, it may become customary, and it may ulti-
mately take on a sense of being obligatory, such that a breach of that ob-
ligation would violate the expectations of the affected community. At 
this point, it may be said to have become customary law. This may be 
especially so if a tribunal has had the opportunity to disclose the sense 
that the behavior has come to be expected as a matter or law.14 
Acknowledging the distinctions between the terms usage, practice, 
custom, international custom, customary law, and customary interna-
tional law will be useful in the remainder of this Article. Long before 
                                                          
14. SADLER, supra note 6, at 8.  
126 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:1 
 
 
customary international law (as that term is currently understood and 
will be discussed below) was conceived, the idea of custom and its rela-
tion to law or customary law had been described and utilized with vary-
ing degrees of success. Custom is among those terms that is blurred 
around the edges and about which there can perhaps be no perfect clar-
ity.15 Thus it is likely that customary law and customary international 
law, which integrate the root notion of custom in at least some respects, 
will similarly be blurry and are perhaps best understood as such. None-
theless, a brief discussion of what is meant by these terms will be use-
ful. 
Practice and Usage. Practice and usage are commonly understood to 
refer to common practices among a people arising from the repeated 
acts thereof.16 They are distinct from the full universe of the activities of 
a people in that practices17 and usages18 are repeated, common, and no-
torious. They are also distinct from law in that, depending on the par-
ticular practice or usage, there may not be legal sanctions for engaging 
in or failing to engage in them.19 A practice or usage may not have ac-
quired the status of custom or of customary law. A simplified example 
might be a particular secret handshake used by members of an exclu-
sive, though large, social group. Members of the group might easily 
identify one another through their practice of using one particular hand-
shake. If the handshake serves no purpose other than to include or ex-
clude members of the social group, it would be termed a usage or a 
practice. Of course, exclusion from the group is a form of social repri-
sal, perhaps even one carrying high costs, but failure to know or use the 
handshake is not actionable by law. When used herein, the terms prac-
tice and usage will be synonymous. 
                                                          
15. For a very useful exposition of the family of meanings attached to the word “custom,” see 
BURTON LEISER, CUSTOM, LAW, AND MORALITY: CONFLICT AND CONTINUITY IN SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR 7–9 (1969) (explaining that a definitional approach that does not expect or seek per-
fect clarity has often been very fruitful in clarifying confusion caused by attempts to utilize overly 
precise terminology, and citing successful examples of this “ordinary-language” approach in con-
temporary scholarship). 
16. The term “usage” originated in Roman law and, like each of the terms defined herein, is 
often interchanged with the others. KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 
xix (2d ed. 1993). 
17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “practice” as “[r]epeated or 
customary action; habitual performance; a succession of acts of similar kind; custom; usage”). 
18. Id. at 1541 (“Usage cannot be proved by isolated instances, but must be certain, uniform 
and notorious.”). 
19. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (6th ed. 2003). 
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It should, of course, be noted that there are many common uses of the 
term custom. Some refer to the practices of single individuals.20 Given 
that this Article will concern itself with the role of the individual in 
forming customary international law, it is worth stating explicitly that 
this Article does not concern itself with the unique “customs,” or habits, 
of single individuals. Rather, it concerns itself with the customs that 
arise among and between people in society. 
Custom. The Oxford English Dictionary defines custom as: “A 
habitual or usual practice; common way of acting; usage, fashion, habit 
(either of an individual or of a community).”21 Custom is thus some-
times used to be essentially synonymous with usage and thus means that 
set of practices of a people which are repeated, common, and notorious. 
This broad definition of custom refers to “all the social rules which are 
observed by the bulk of the members of a society.”22 This definition, 
however, would accommodate the handshake example used above, as it 
makes no distinction between usage and custom that, within law, is sig-
nificant. By this understanding, usage and custom are synonyms. 
Others have used custom to denote the subset of usage and practice 
that has attained the status of law such that an authoritative body would 
recognize it as customary law and enforce it if given the opportunity to 
make explicit the status of the behavior. This is the distinction between 
usage and custom generally utilized in American legal doctrine,23 which 
recognizes that widespread usage and acceptance can be an important 
source of law. Except where deviations are made explicit, this Article 
will employ the term custom in this latter sense.24 Custom, then, is that 
body of practice that has become expected by a people to such a degree 
that it has become law. 
Custom thus refers to those norms that are both usage and law. These 
norms are widespread, accepted, and, in many instances, of a longstand-
                                                          
20. As in, “It is Adam’s custom to shine his shoes every Friday.” 
21. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 167 (2d ed. 1989). 
22. SADLER, supra note 6, at 2. 
23. See, e.g., United States ex rel. E&R Constr. Co. v. Guy H. James Constr. Co., 390 F. 
Supp. 1193, 1209 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Reverman, 49 S.W.2d 558, 560 
(Ky. 1932). 
24. Other terminological distinctions are possible, of course, and this Article does not attempt 
to exhaust the various possibilities. Francisco Suarez and others have distinguished between cus-
tom as fact (meaning the kind of act which people engage in with regularity without any legal 
compulsion) and custom as law (meaning those acts in which people engage with regularity and 
which they are obliged or required to do under penalty of law). FRANCISCO SUAREZ, A TREATISE 
ON LAWS AND GOD THE LAWGIVER (1612), reprinted in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF 
FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J. 446 (1944). 
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ing nature. Such norms become law as a result of uniform practice or 
acceptance and, at least theoretically, become law even before an au-
thoritative or juridical body has an opportunity to assess their status as 
law. For example, one can imagine a society in which rules of the road 
were not codified in statutes. In such a society, it is plausible that some 
uniform rule about what drivers do at a four-way intersection would 
arise. Uniform practice might well arise dictating that the first to arrive 
at the intersection also would be the first allowed to drive through the 
intersection. If one day a driver violated this usage, a person harmed by 
this violation might sue the violator. If a reviewing authority—a court—
would or ought to find the common practice enforceable such that the 
violator would be held liable to the injured party, one might say that 
even before the court reviewed the case, this driving usage had attained 
the status of law. It had become customary law.25 Used in this way, cus-
tom refers to the factual circumstance (such as the existence of a par-
ticular practice that is accepted among people as law), while customary 
law refers to a normative claim (for example, that a just court would 
recognize this usage as law or that a particular usage has been recog-
nized as law). Custom and customary law are distinct from one another, 
but only procedurally. In relation to custom, no reviewing authority has 
had an opportunity to recognize the legal status of a usage, and in the 
case of customary law, a reviewing authority has both had this opportu-
nity and has recognized the usage as law. This close connection between 
the terms custom and customary law allows them to be used synony-
mously in most instances herein.26 
The terms international custom and customary international law 
(CIL) will be used to refer to that set of practices to which attach inter-
national rights or legal obligations. Obligations and rights in respect to 
particular practices may “become international” for a number of rea-
sons. First, international obligations and rights may attach because the 
practice itself has an international character. Second, international rights 
and obligations might attach because the entities engaged in that prac-
tice are states, the traditional subjects and objects of international law. 
State practice thus contributes to international custom. Third, rights and 
obligations might attach under international law because the practices 
relate to international or global problems such as nuclear war, global 
                                                          
25. For a thorough discussion of the process by which usage becomes law, see SADLER, supra 
note 6, at 50–54. 
26. Karol Wolfke has employed a similar demarcation of these terms in the international con-
text. WOLFKE, supra note 16, at xx.  
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environmental concerns, the protection of human rights, etc. Finally, in-
ternational rights and obligations might attach because sufficient uni-
formity about a practice has arisen internationally among the entities 
that will enjoy the rights or be burdened by obligations once the practice 
becomes CIL.  
B. Customary International Law 
 
1. A Brief History 
Discussions on custom as a means by which international law is 
formed often begin with Francisco Suarez, whose 1612 Tractus De 
legibus ac deo legislatore provides the first record of custom being rec-
ognized as a source of international law.27 
Custom as a source of international law appears to have been recog-
nized in an international treaty for the first time relatively recently. In 
1874, Article 9 of the Conference of Brussels on the Laws and Customs 
of War stated:  
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but 
also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following condi-
tions: 
1. That they be commanded by a person responsible for his sub-
ordinates; 
2. That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 
distance; 
3. That they carry arms openly; and 
4. That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war.28 
                                                          
27. BEN CHIGARA, LEGITIMACY DEFICIT IN CUSTOM: A DECONSTRUCTIONIST CRITIQUE 2 
(2001). 
28. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Aug. 
27, 1874, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 25, 28 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman 
eds., 3rd ed. 1988) (emphasis added), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/135-
70009?OpenDocument. This conference was convened by Russia to discuss an international 
agreement on the content of the rules of war. The delegates to the Conference were unable to 
agree on it as a binding treaty, and it was never ratified. Plausibly, then, its more enduring contri-
bution to international legal doctrine is as the first such Convention that included a distinction 
between the laws of war and the customs of war. Other humanitarian law treaties of the time 
adopted this distinction without explicitly setting out what was meant by laws of war as opposed 
to customs of war. 
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In 1899, Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land and its annex, Regulations concerning the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, stated in its preamble that: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High 
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not in-
cluded in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and bel-
ligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles 
of international law, as they result from the usages established 
between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the re-
quirements of the public conscience.29 
This preamble is particularly noteworthy. Not only does it encompass 
laws of war and customs of war, but it also lists the sources of the “prin-
ciples of international law” to which it refers. That list includes the pub-
lic conscience as a source separate and distinct from the usages of na-
tions. 
2. The Modern Doctrine 
The distinction between international laws of war and customs of war 
as found in these early humanitarian law documents has become en-
trenched in modern formulations of international law as the distinction 
between treaty and custom. All leading authorities recognize the impor-
tance of both treaty law and custom as sources of international law.30  
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice sets out 
the sources of international law as follows: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with in-
ternational law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
  a. international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
  b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law; 
  c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions; 
  d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions 
                                                          
29. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 28, at 69, 70 (emphasis added). 
30. See, e. g., BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 3–29; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
117–36 (2001); MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2003); 
SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); ON THE FOUNDATIONS AND 
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 2003). 
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and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.31 
Of particular interest for a discussion of CIL, then, is Article 38(1)(b) 
of the Statute. It is the traditional starting point for discussions of CIL32 
despite the “widely reported defective drafting of article 38(1)(b).”33 
This Article will not concern itself with whether the Statute was worded 
appropriately. Rather, it will focus particularly on the question of who 
has a role in shaping the international custom to which the Statute re-
fers. 
Section 102 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States also sets out the sources of international law: 
1. A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as 
such by the international community of states  
  a. in the form of customary law;  
  b. by international agreement; or  
  c. by derivation from general principles common to the major 
legal systems of the world.34 
The Restatement defines CIL slightly differently than Article 
38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ as the law that “results from a general 
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation”35 and provides, in Comment (b) thereto, a brief elaboration 
of the acts and omissions that contribute to the making of customary in-
                                                          
31. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993 (emphasis added); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 6. Article 38 should not, 
however, be seen as the eternal and exhaustive list of the sources of international law. 
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
32. WOLFKE, supra note 16, at 2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 102, Reporters’ Note 1 (1987). The Statute of the International Court of 
Justice forms an “integral part of the [United Nations] Charter” by way of annexation. INT’L 
COURT OF JUSTICE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 9 (5th ed. 2004). As such, it is not a 
formal source of law any more than the Charter itself. Rather, it is a material source of law, albeit 
a highly important one. 
33. CHIGARA, supra note 27, at 320; see also WOLFKE, supra note 16, at 6 (citing Edwin M. 
Borchard, The Theory and Sources of International Law, in 3 RECUEIL D'ÉTUDES SUR LES 
SOURCES DU DROIT, EN L'HONNEUR DE FRANCOIS GÉNY 328, 347 (1934); 1 GEORG 
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (3d ed. 1957)). 
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(1) 
(1987) (emphasis added). 
35. Id. at § 102(2). 
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ternational law, of the temporal aspect of CIL, and of the delineations 
between general and specific CIL.36 
Under both Article 38(1)(b) and Restatement Section 102, CIL is 
composed of two elements.37 The first is termed the objective or prac-
tice element, and it looks to the actual practice and behavior of states. 
The second is termed the subjective element, or the requirement that the 
particular norm is observed out of a sense of legal obligation. This sec-
ond subjective element is known as the opinio juris requirement.38 
3. Critiques of CIL Formation Doctrine 
Both the objective and the subjective elements of CIL have under-
gone extensive scrutiny, and each has been analyzed from various per-
spectives.39 For example, in addressing the subjective element of CIL, 
Anthony D’Amato describes CIL’s inherent “circularity problem.” In 
his book, The Concept of Custom in International Law, he asks “[h]ow 
can custom create law if its psychological component requires action in 
conscious accordance with law preexisting the action?”40 
The practice requirement of CIL also has been highly scrutinized, as 
authors have asked how much time is necessary to create custom41 as 
well as how much consistency42 and widespread acceptance is re-
quired.43 In fact, one can find proposals in the CIL literature that argue 
                                                          
36. Id. at § 102(2) cmt. b. 
37. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29 (June 3) (“[T]he material of 
customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of 
States.”). 
38. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. / F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 
20) (“The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a le-
gal obligation.”); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276–77 (Nov. 20); S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. 
v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18, 28; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. c (1987); BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 7–
10. 
39. One of the most comprehensive and coherent presentations of the various problems inher-
ent in CIL can be found in ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 102 Reporters’ Note 2  (1987).  
40. D’AMATO, supra note 39, at 66. 
41. Id. at 58 (“[T]he literature contains no standards or criteria for determining how much 
time is necessary to create a usage that can qualify as customary international law . . . .”). 
42. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1823, 1874 (2002).  
43. See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 
125 (2005).  
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that either the objective element44 or the subjective element should be 
eliminated all together.45 
Many critiques of CIL attempt to address the doctrine as a whole, of-
ten asserting new theories of CIL,46 setting out alternatives to CIL,47 or 
attempting to hobble or strongly curtail its validity or uses.48 Occasion-
ally, commentators make explicit whether they are addressing problems 
in the means by which CIL is formed,49 the means by which states be-
come obligated to observe CIL,50 or the means by which it is imple-
mented.51 This Article will focus specifically on the means by which 
CIL is formed. 
                                                          
44. For a well-articulated argument that the objective element can be eliminated, see id. at 
149–58. 
45. For an argument that the subjective element is deeply flawed, see, for example, MICHAEL 
BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 140 (1999) (quoting Peter Haggenmacher, 
La doctrine des deux éléments du droit coutumier dans la practique de la cour internationale, 90 
REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIC 5 (1986) (Fr.), which argues that there is 
no subjective element in CIL, and that the opinio juris element is nothing more than an interpreta-
tion of state practice at the international level). See also Guzman, supra note 43, at 145 n.131 (“‘It 
is not in fact necessary to demonstrate the presence of the subjective element in all, or perhaps 
even most, instances…Where there is a well established practice, the Court and other interna-
tional tribunals, not to mention the States themselves, tend to conclude that there is a customary 
rule without looking for proof of opinio juris.’” (quoting Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation 
of Customary International Law, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS 165, 250, 289 (1998))). 
46. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 43; George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary 
International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (2005). 
47. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 550 (1993) 
(arguing that a significantly developed international legal system creates the opportunity for a 
universal international law binding on all States, and observing that “[c]ustomary international 
law, which has traditionally been a product of state practice and opinio juris, is particularly vul-
nerable” to questions regarding the validity of international law). 
48. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (proposing that 
customary international law should not give rise to a cause of action without express authority 
from either state or federal legislative bodies); see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Fur-
ther Thoughts on Customary International Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 191, 191 (2001); Jack L. 
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 
(1999); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern 
and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (2000) (using “the tools of 
game theory to sketch a positive theoretical account” of CIL and arguing that “CIL emerges from 
nations’ pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage”). 
49. See infra Section I.B for discussion of modern critiques of CIL formation. 
50. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 48; Guzman, supra note 43; Norman & Trachtman, 
supra note 46.  
51. An excellent roadmap of the debate on CIL implementation can be found in Ernest A. 
Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2002). 
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The most commonly contemplated strands of inquiry in respect to 
CIL formation ask what counts as state practice,52 how many states need 
to participate in the practice in order for it to be considered CIL,53 and 
over what period of time such state practice must continue in order for it 
to be considered custom.54 
In addition to these questions,55 writers such as Michael Byers and 
Charles de Visscher question the principle of sovereign equality as it re-
lates to CIL by asking what role is played by power in CIL formation.56 
                                                          
52. See ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 131–42 
(1987) (encapsulating the debate between D’Amato and Michael Akehurst regarding what behav-
ior counts as state practice); D’AMATO, supra note 39; Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of 
International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 1–3 (1974–1975). 
53. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. / F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 
20). 
54. See id. For an interesting discussion of “instant” CIL, see Bin Cheng, United Nations 
Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 
(1965). 
55. These lines of inquiry roughly track an early effort to clarify how evidence of custom was 
to be derived. Judge Manley Ottmer Hudson, Special Rapporteur to the International Law Com-
mission, stated in 1950 that the elements that must be present before a principle or rule of cus-
tomary international law can be found to have become established were: 
a. concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of situation fal-
ling within the domain of international relations; 
b. continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time; 
c. conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing interna-
tional law; and 
d. general acquiescence in the practice by other States. 
Manley O. Hudson, Working Paper on Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law 
Commission, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 24, 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16/SER.A/1950. 
56. In a commonly quoted passage, de Visscher likens CIL formation to the formation of a 
dirt road across virgin land: “Among the users are always some who mark the soil more deeply 
with their footprints than others, either because of their weight, which is to say their power in this 
world, or because their interests bring them more frequently this way.” CHARLES DE VISSCHER, 
THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (P. E. Corbett trans., 1957), quoted 
in Michael Byers, Power, Obligation, and Customary International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 81, 84 (2001). Byers defines “power” broadly to include various types of non-legal 
power, such as military might, power derived from wealth (which affords states the possibility of 
applying economic pressures as well as diplomatic pressures on other states), and power derived 
from moral authority. He describes CIL formation as a process through which states use their 
power to develop, change, or maintain rules. Naturally, the strength of a given state’s power de-
termines whether or to what extent that state is able to influence the formation and mutation of 
CIL. BYERS, supra note 45, at 5–6. 
Detlev Vagts extends this view in what he calls hegemonic international law. Others, adopting 
the theory of hegemonic international law, have described the proceedings of international institu-
tions in order to illuminate the benefits and detriments of a hegemonic approach to international 
treaty and customary law making and/or subverting. See Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic Interna-
tional Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843 (2001); Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revis-
ited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873 (2003). 
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What is remarkable in this literature is that virtually all of it has ac-
cepted the core premise that only states can form CIL. The idea that in-
dividuals ought to have a participatory role in CIL formation is nearly 
completely absent.57 Only a handful of commentators have suggested 
overtly that individuals ought to be included in the process of CIL for-
mation. This commentary will be discussed at length in the Section that 
follows. 
II. FOUNDATIONAL LITERATURE: SKEPTICISM, ALLUSION, AND 
POSSIBILITY 
The literature on CIL includes writings in which individuals figure as 
shadows and whispers in relation to CIL. This literature can be broken 
into three categories. The first category is small and will fall under the 
rubric of “skepticism.” The skeptics explicitly mention the possibility of 
including individuals, but they dismiss the possibility outright.58 The 
second, larger category falls under the rubric “allusion.” The allusionists 
suggest some role for the individual without ever making this sugges-
tion explicit. 
A third category of foundational legal scholarship has greatly in-
formed this article. This is the work of a small number of scholars who 
have seen the possibility of including individuals in CIL formation and, 
to some degree, have addressed it directly and optimistically.59 This lit-
erature is groundbreaking in its imagination and creativity. A discussion 
of this literature will illustrate, however, that despite the treatment this 
possibility has received, to date there is no robust theory of individual 
participation in CIL formation.60 
                                                          
57. See Christiana Ochoa, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of International Law: Identifying 
and Defining CIL Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
58. The skeptics included only those commentators that have seen the possibility of including 
individuals. Of course, there are whole lines of international law theory that would see interna-
tional law as a purely state-based enterprise. There are also commentators that see portions of in-
ternational law (namely enforcement) as requiring a state-based system. See, e.g., Anthony 
D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?,  79 NW. U. L. REV 1293, 1303-1313 (1984). 
Thank you to Anthony D’Amato for this comment. 
59. See infra Section II.C. 
60. It is possible and likely that I have not captured every reference available with respect to 
these categories of literature. This is most likely in relation to the Allusionists; in this category, 
my purpose is to give examples that illustrate the prevalence of this idea in the underexplored 
shadows of other work. If I have failed to include key sources, I look forward to learning about 
those sources I have missed. My aim is not to create a bibliography of foundational literature, but 
to highlight existing work that provides theoretical footing for the ideas discussed in the main 
body of the present Article. 
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A. Skepticism 
As stated previously, the foundational literature that explicitly but 
dismissively mentions the possibility of individuals participating in CIL 
creation is small. David Fidler, in Challenging the Classical Concept of 
Custom, points to the liberal notion that the cross-border activity of pri-
vate parties serves a “quasi-public purpose” resulting in increased inter-
dependence between nations, stating: 
Perhaps it follows from liberal international theory that the CIL 
process should take into account the practice of private persons 
and enterprises as well as the practice of States. Such a notion is 
even more radical than the idea that the State practice of democ-
racies should count more than that of dictatorships or other types 
of non-liberal States. 61 
Similarly, Michael Byers has squarely, although curtly, addressed the 
possibility of including individuals in the CIL formation process. He ac-
cepts that, according to the German Historical School of Savigny and 
Ranke, opinio juris “is the common will, or legal consciousness of a 
Volk, or people.”62 He dismisses the potential relevance of this defini-
tion of opinion juris to CIL, however, stating: 
It is difficult...to see how shared consciousnesses could exist in 
respect of the substantive content of each and every rule of cus-
tomary international law, especially those rules of a highly tech-
nical character. In addition, from a ‘traditional’ international law 
perspective such shared consciousnesses would necessarily exist 
among States, as opposed to people or peoples.63 
B. Allusion 
Compared to those authors who have addressed directly, either with 
skepticism or optimism, the possibility of individuals participating in 
CIL formation, the world of scholars alluding to individuals playing 
such a role is immense. In this second category, it is as if individuals ei-
                                                          
61. David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom, 39 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 
198, 241 (1996). Professor Fidler is referring to the controversy among CIL theorists, see, e.g., 
supra note 56, that powerful states often do tread more heavily and more often on the path toward 
CIL creation, and that perhaps liberal, democratic, or free states ought to carry more weight in 
CIL creation.  
62. BYERS, supra note 45, at 139. 
63. Id. at 139–140. 
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ther already play a role so recognized and accepted as to be unworthy of 
mention or are so disenfranchised within international law that expli-
citly mentioning the possibility is imprudent, or pausing upon it for re-
flection is not even considered. Either way, this literature is frustrating 
because it cannot be cited uncontroversially as forming a foundation for 
the inclusion of individuals in CIL formation. 
It is, of course, impossible to know what reasons these various com-
mentators would give for making such allusions without more careful 
articulation and clarification. It is similarly impossible to know what 
role allusions to this possibility played along the path to theories on 
various aspects of international law or international relations. However, 
the insinuation of a role for the individual in CIL formation, even when 
indirect, is useful evidence of others having imagined this possibility. 
Such references, especially when cobbled together, begin to shape a 
rough path toward the proposal made herein. In many instances, careful 
readers of this literature will recognize some of the difficulties posed by 
the absence of individuals. This gap challenges a coherent articulation 
of CIL that bears real relevance and holds real legitimacy in a world in 
which the subjects of international law now include individuals.64 
The German Historical School of Savigny and Ranke65 holds that the 
opinio juris component of CIL is the legal consciousness of a people.66 
For now, this bears mention because Anthony Carty has attempted to 
reintroduce such an approach, although rather than address the role that 
this form of opinio juris would play in CIL creation, he has focused 
more squarely on nationalism.67 Utilizing the language of opinio juris 
through a renegotiation of its most commonly accepted definition is one 
way to involve the individual in CIL formation. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach has not yet been thoroughly elaborated. 
                                                          
64. For a discussion of individuals as the subjects of international law, see infra Section III.A.  
65. The German Historical School refers to the work of Friedrich von Savigny and Leopold 
von Ranke. For this original work, see LEOPOLD VON RANKE, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
HISTORY (Georg Iggers & Konrad von Moltke eds., Wilma Iggers & Konrad von Moltke trans., 
1973) and Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Grundgedanken der Historischen Rechtsschule, in 
QUELLENBUCH ZUR GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (Erik Wolf ed., 
1950), cited in BYERS, supra note 45, at 139. 
66. See ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE 
LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 30–39 (1986); ROGER 
COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 21 (2d ed. 1992); see also BYERS, 
supra note 45, at 139. Their approach would require analysis of the historical, political, and social 
context in which Savigny and Ranke developed their ideas. This falls outside of the scope of the 
current Article, but will be discussed in a forthcoming article by the author. 
67. See CARTY, supra note 66, at 36–39. 
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In the literature on CIL formation, it is not uncommon for authors to 
stop just short of including non-state actors in the CIL process. One 
senses a push against the traditional barrier, which restricts participation 
to states alone. For example, in an interesting overview of the impor-
tance and creation of CIL in various international law fields, Anja 
Seibert-Fohr proposes a role for the “international community as such,” 
without indicating how or why she is making such a claim or specifying 
exactly to whom she is referring.68 
Daniel Bodansky takes this type of allusion one step further when–
against the accepted doctrine–he states that, “[a]ccording to the stan-
dard account of customary international law, claims about customary 
law are empirical claims about the ways that states (and other interna-
tional actors) regularly behave.”69 Bodansky’s claim that the standard 
account of CIL formation includes states “and other international ac-
tors” is notable because the standard account does no such thing.70 For 
example, Section 102 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States refers only to states as CIL law-creators. My 
object, however, is not to correct Professor Bodansky, as he is well-
versed in matters of CIL and many other international law topics, but to 
expose two rather common phenomena. The first is that it is not unusual 
to see claims that non-state actors have CIL formation powers. This in-
stance is particularly useful because Professor Bodansky makes clear 
that he is referring to, “[f]or example, international organizations, trans-
national corporations and other non-governmental groups.”71 The sec-
ond notable phenomenon, and here Professor Bodansky’s claim is a par-
ticularly clear example, is that it is not unusual to find allusions to a role 
for non-state or supra-state actors portrayed as “standard.” This raises 
twin questions. First, why are claims for including non-state actors be-
ing made? Second, why are such claims being conveyed as standard? 
                                                          
68. Anja Seibert-Fohr, Unity and Diversity in the Formation and Relevance of Customary In-
ternational Law: Modern Concepts of Customary International Law as a Manifestation of a 
Value-Based International Order, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (An-
dreas Zimmermann & Rainer Hofmann eds., 2006).  
69. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 
3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 108 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
70. One can scour the traditional texts on CIL and find no such reference. See, e.g., Statute of 
the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) and 
comments thereto. 
71. Bodansky, supra note 69, at 108 n.17. 
2007] THE INDIVIDUAL AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 
 
 
In a well-known article, the late Professor Jonathan Charney elabo-
rated some of the shortfalls of CIL doctrine and demanded that interna-
tional legal doctrine grow in its substantive coverage as well as in its 
universal enforceability.72 In his proposal for universal international 
law, he alludes to the utility, or perhaps the necessity, of broad and ac-
tive participation by “all states and other interested groups” in the law-
creation process if that process is to operate legitimately.73 
This Article agrees with Charney’s assertion that including such ac-
tors would result in greater legitimacy74–whether to CIL or to an alter-
native such as the one proposed by Charney. Still, because Charney 
only mentions very briefly the possibility of including actors other than 
states in the law-creation process, one is left with a series of questions 
about his intentions, motivations, and, indeed, his theory for such inclu-
sion. Again, this is by no means a criticism of Charney’s work. Rather, 
it is another example in which the ideas articulated by the present Arti-
cle have been invoked without a thorough elaboration. 
Even more direct, yet still in the category of allusion, are references 
to the participation of non-state actors in a form similar to that offered 
by Professor Mendelson. In his useful exposition on the formation of 
CIL, Professor Mendelson ventures his own working definition of CIL: 
A rule of customary international law is one which emerges 
from, and is sustained by, the constant and uniform practice of 
States and other subjects of international law, in their interna-
tional relations, in circumstances which give rise to a legitimate 
expectation of similar conduct in the future.75  
In a relatively full elaboration of what he means by his inclusion of 
“other subjects of international law,” Mendelson states that “[a] contri-
bution to the formation of customary international law, in a broader 
sense, is also made by other types of entity, such as non-governmental 
international organizations...multinational and national corporations; 
and even individuals.”76 Unfortunately, in his explanation of how non-
state entities participate in the formulation of international law, Mendel-
                                                          
72. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (1993).  
73. Id. at 547 (emphasis added). 
74. See also JORDAN PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 4 
(2003). 
75. Maurice H. Mendelson, Formation of Customary International Law, in 272 RECUEIL DES 
COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165, 188 
(1998) (emphasis added). 
76. Id. at 203. 
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son does not return to the individual in particular. Rather, he treats all 
non-state actors as similarly situated. He acknowledges that all such ac-
tors may, in the current state of international law, have an indirect role 
in CIL formation, but he insists further that states “have…a tight mo-
nopoly over the law-making process.”77 
It is noteworthy that Mendelson seems somewhat apologetic for this 
position. After insisting that states currently monopolize the CIL mak-
ing process, he writes, “[t]his may not sound very ‘progressive’, and 
some may consider it undesirable for States to have such a tight monop-
oly over the law-making process; but in my opinion that is the present 
reality.”78 Indeed, this Article does not dispute that this is the current 
state of the formal articulation of the law. Rather, it aims (1) to rearticu-
late the realists’ observation that the formal doctrine on CIL formation 
may not reflect the actual formation process, and (2) to articulate why 
such a tight state monopoly on CIL formation is undesirable. 
C. Possibility  
As stated previously, the universe of literature which has considered 
explicitly the possibility of individual participation in CIL formation is 
remarkably small. This literature will be discussed below under the ru-
bric of “possibility.” 
1. Realism: Participation in International Legal Process 
Professor Myres McDougal, writing together in 1967 with Professors 
Harold Lasswell and Michael Reisman, contemplates the various roles 
individuals might play in decisional processes related to international 
law and identifies the essential problem of individuals being “locked 
out.” Because their phrasing and language feels avant-garde even today, 
and because their work is highly relevant to this project, it bears quoting 
at length: 
 Most of us are performing...decision roles without being fully 
aware of the scope and consequences of our acts. Because of this, 
our participation is often considerably less effective than it might 
be. Every individual cannot, of course, realistically expect or 
demand to be a decisive factor in every major decision. Yet the 
converse feeling of pawnlike political impotence, of being locked 
                                                          
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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out of effective decision, is an equally unwarranted orientation. 
The limits of the individual's role in international as in local 
processes is as much a function of his passive acquiescence and 
ignorance of the potentialities of his participation as of the struc-
tures of the complex human organizations of the contemporary 
world.... 
 A more systematic expansion of these impressionistic remarks 
about the individual human being's increasing role in, and re-
sponsibility for, world affairs would require the careful descrip-
tion of a comprehensive world social process, in terms of a set of 
interlocking, transnational, functional and geographic interac-
tions; of the global or earth-space process of effective power 
which is an integral part of the larger transnational community 
matrix; and of the processes of authoritative decision, including a 
world constitutive process, maintained by the holders of effective 
power for identifying and securing their common interests. For 
our immediate purposes it will suffice merely to summarize that 
there is today among the peoples of the world a rising, common 
demand for the greater production and wider sharing of all the 
basic values associated with a free society or public order of hu-
man dignity; that there is an increasing perception by peoples of 
their inescapable interdependence in the shaping and sharing of 
all such demanded values; and that peoples everywhere, both ef-
fective leaders and the less well positioned are exhibiting in-
creasing identifications with larger and larger groups, extending 
to the whole of mankind.79 
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman are elaborating on the seven func-
tions of effective decision process earlier articulated by Lasswell.80 No-
                                                          
79. Myres S. McDougal et al., Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configura-
tive Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 193–94 (1968).  
80. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, THE DECISION PROCESS: SEVEN CATEGORIES OF FUNCTIONAL 
ANALYSIS (1956). These seven categories (intelligence, promotion or recommendation, prescrip-
tion, invocation, application, termination, appraisal) are defined in Myres S. McDougal, Harold 
D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 
19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 261 (1967) as follows: 
1. Intelligence is the obtaining, processing, and dissemination of information (includ-
ing planning). 
2. Promotion (or recommendation) is the advocacy of general policy. 
3. Prescription is the crystallization of general policy in continuing community ex-
pectations. 
4. Invocation is the provisional characterization of concrete circumstances in refer-
ence to prescriptions. 
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tably, they were very aware that they were at the forefront of a signifi-
cant change in “world social process” and, especially in early manifesta-
tions of their ideas, they called their own remarks “preliminary,” while 
sharing their sense about what a clearer elaboration would require.81 
This project of elaboration is still underway.  
2. Individuals Front and Center 
In the chronological development of this idea, Lung-chu Chen is the 
next important figure, as his contribution sprang from work in which he 
engaged jointly with McDougal and Lasswell.82 And develop it they did, 
together with perceptible changes in international law. In 1980, when 
Professor Chen wrote with McDougal and Lasswell, even in a moment 
of inspiration in which they saw “almost unlimited democratic poten-
                                                                                                                                      
5. Application is the final characterization of concrete circumstances according to 
prescriptions. 
6. Termination is the ending of a prescription and the disposition of legitimate expec-
tations created when the prescription was in effect. 
7. Appraisal is the evaluation of the manner and measure in which public policies 
have been put into effect and the responsibility therefor [sic]. 
This framework was central to a body of work by a number of international legal scholars, es-
pecially Lasswell, McDougal, Reisman, and Lung-chu Chen. See, e.g., id.; MYRES MCDOUGAL 
ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER ch. 4 (1980). 
81. Myres McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for In-
quiry, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 237, 237 n.* (1969). 
82. See MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 161–186, 
264 (1980). Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen published together extensively in this era. 
See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Aggregate Interest in Shared Respect and Human Rights: 
The Harmonization of Public Order and Civic Order, 23 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 183 (1977); 
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Freedom from Discrimination in Choice of Language and Interna-
tional Human Rights, 1 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151 (1976); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights 
and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 
(1969); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The 
Outlawing of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 497 (1975); McDougal, Lasswell & 
Chen, The Human Rights of the Aged: An Application of the General Norm of Nondiscrimination, 
28 U. FLA. L. REV. 639 (1976); McDougal & Chen, Introduction: Human Rights and Jurispru-
dence, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 337 (1981); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationality and Human 
Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900 (1974); McDou-
gal, Lasswell & Chen, Non-Conforming Political Opinion and Human Rights: Transnational Pro-
tection against Discrimination, 2 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1 (1975); McDougal, Lasswell 
& Chen, The Protection of Aliens from Discrimination and World Public Order: Responsibility of 
States Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 432 (1976); McDougal, Lasswell & 
Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public Or-
der, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 919 (1975); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights and World Pub-
lic Order: Human Rights in Comprehensive Context, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 227 (1977); McDougal, 
Lasswell & Chen, The Right to Religious Freedom and World Public Order: The Emerging Norm 
of Nondiscrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 865 (1976). 
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tial” as to the ability of individuals to participate in the intelligence, 
promotion, invocation, termination and appraisal functions of effective 
decision making, they hesitated as to the ability of the individual to par-
ticipate in the prescription and application functions.83 
As early as 1978, Professor Chen observed that individuals were in-
creasingly demanding a voice in decisions that affect and determine 
their own value systems, which included a number of enumerated hu-
man rights. In addition, he noted that individuals were increasingly de-
manding full participation in decision making processes and value set-
ting.84 
A decade later, Professor Chen noted that “[t]ransnational structures 
of authority and procedures for application have been established and 
maintained…to secure greater compliance with…human rights.”85 Re-
markably, through these structures, “individuals and private groups are 
given increased, though still limited, access to arenas of transnational 
authority to bring complaints about human rights deprivations against 
even their own governments.”86 
In relation to the participation of individuals in CIL formation, Pro-
fessor Chen says, “[u]nder the concept of ‘custom’ that creates law 
through widely congruent patterns of peoples’ behavior and other com-
munications, individuals and their private associations have always par-
ticipated in the prescribing function.”87 In making this statement, Chen 
relies on a conception of CIL formation that appears to deviate from the 
traditional account. In order to make this leap, Chen breaks from legal 
formalism in respect to CIL formation and argues for what he believes 
is a more realistic assessment of how custom is formed. 
While many may not be willing to stretch the traditional CIL doctrine 
to such extents, Chen’s framework is quite useful for its thoughtful real-
ist approach to the actual participants in CIL. In keeping with the New 
                                                          
83. McDougal et al., supra note 80, at 193. “While the public functions of prescription and 
application are necessarily restricted, in terms of direct participation, to a very small, though 
hopefully, representative group, participation in all other functions presents almost unlimited de-
mocratic potential.” Id. at 192–93. 
84. Lung-chu Chen, The Meek Shall Inherit a Global Bill of Rights: What Used to Be a 
Dream Is Emerging as a Necessary Reality of World Order, 7 HUM. RTS. 16 (1978). 
85. LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 79 (1989). Professor Chen goes on to state: “Although nation-
states continue to play the most prominent role in the prescribing (and terminating) and applying 
functions, individuals and private groups play important roles in regard to other decision func-
tions….” Id. at 80. 
86. Id. at 80. 
87. Id. 
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Haven School of which he was a part, he articulates the realist’s impor-
tant observation that individuals are the ultimate participants in every 
social process, whether as individuals per se or as part of private groups 
or states.88 By seeing through the nomenclature of CIL, which is highly 
reliant on states, Chen attempts to convince his readers that individuals 
are very active participants in international decision making processes 
generally, and in CIL formation particularly.89 
Professor Chen’s 1989 book on international law devotes one chapter 
entirely to a discussion of the changed and changing role of the individ-
ual in international law and the various means by which the changed 
and expanded role of the individual has distorted, perhaps beyond com-
prehension, the subject-object dichotomy in international law. Essen-
tially, he observes, as others did before him, that the individual has be-
come a subject of international law. For Chen, the traditional model of 
international law, which holds that states are its lone subjects, if it ever 
was accurate, is now simply outmoded.90 Both Chen and this Article 
agree, of course, that states play the most prominent role in some inter-
national law processes. Even if (or when) the individual is formally rec-
ognized as a legitimate participant in the creation of CIL, the state will 
continue to hold this position of prominence. 
Professor Chen’s written work on the proposition that individuals 
ought to and do participate in international decision making processes 
spans decades.91 It overlaps with the work of Jordan Paust. 
                                                          
88. Id. at 80–81. The New Haven School was created and developed by McDougal, Lasswell 
and others, including Chen. Its inspiration is rooted in American Legal Realism; it uses its mo-
dalities to reconceptualize and recharacterize international law and relations. For Professor 
Chen’s own definition of the New Haven School, see Lung-chu Chen, Perspectives from the New 
Haven School, 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 407 (1993). 
89. CHEN, supra note 85, at 80. 
90. Id. at 76–81. This Article accepts this position and builds upon it. This Article discusses 
the expanded universe of subjects of international law, including individuals, in Section III.A. 
91. This has been just one of Professor Lung-chu Chen’s scholarly projects. The list of his 
works relevant to this project is lengthy. See, e.g., In Affectionate Memory of Professor Myres 
McDougal: Champion for an International Law of Human Dignity, 108 YALE L.J. 953 (1999); 
Constitutional Law and International Law in the United States of America, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 
SUPP. 453 (1994); Human Rights and the Free Flow of Information, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 37 (1982-1983); Human Rights and World Public Order, 1 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. 
ANN. 109 (1978); Institutions Specialized to the Protection of Human Rights in the United States, 
1 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 3 (1983); The Meek Shall Inherit a Global Bill of Rights, 7 HUM. 
RTS. 16 (1978); Perspectives from the New Haven School, 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 407 
(1993); Protection of Persons (Natural and Juridical), 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 542 (1989); Self-
Determination and World Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287 (1990). 
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3. CIL Has Long Recognized Non-State Actors 
Professor Paust has pointed out that individuals have been and realis-
tically are included in CIL formation.92 It is his position that: 
The expectations of all human beings (“mankind,” “the world,” 
“the people”) are not only relevant [to CIL] but they also provide 
the ultimate criterial referent. Indeed, no other ultimate referent 
would be realistic, since all human beings recognizably partici-
pate in such a process of acceptance and the shaping of attitudes 
whether or not such participation is actually recognized by each 
individual or is as effective as it might otherwise be (e.g., even if 
apathetic "inaction" is the form of participation for some, a form 
that simply allows others a more significant role) (footnote omit-
ted). It is this ultimate referent, moreover, that provides custom-
ary law with a built-in basis for its own general efficacy, resting 
as it does on actual patterns of generally shared legal expectation, 
and with a claim to being the most democratic form of interna-
tional law.93  
In substantiating the view that individuals already do participate in 
CIL formation, Professor Paust asserts that leading authorities also have 
recognized the importance of individuals to determinations of CIL. He 
notes, for example, that a number of important historical Supreme Court 
decisions regarded the international law of nations as established by 
“the general consent of mankind,”94 and that Blackstone stated that the 
“law of nations is a system of rules…established by universal consent 
among the civilized inhabitants of the world.”95 
This Article disputes that individual participation is historically 
and/or traditionally accepted by CIL doctrine. More accurate is Paust’s 
later characterization of the active role that non-state actors play in the 
CIL of human rights as a legal realist’s view of what actually happens in 
                                                          
92. Paust asserts this belief in a number of articles. See Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, 
Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 147 (1996) 
[hereinafter Paust, Nature, Sources and Evidences]; Customary International Law: Its Nature, 
Sources and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59 (1990) [hereinafter Paust, 
Customary International Law]; The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the 
International Legal Process, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1229 (2004) [hereinafter Paust, Reality of Pri-
vate Rights]. 
93. Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 92, at 62. 
94. Id. at 59 (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796)). 
95. Id. at 60–61 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 66 (1765)). 
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CIL formation.96 In this view, there is “no single set of partici-
pants…[l]ike all human law, [CIL] is full of human choice and rich in 
individual and group participation,” irrespective of the formal state-
centric doctrine on CIL formation.97 
Professor Paust’s contributions, then, consist of holding to the view 
that individuals already participate in forming CIL and maintaining that 
they are acknowledged already in CIL doctrine.98  
4. Challenging the Doctrine to Include NGOs 
Professor Isabelle Gunning has proposed that the CIL formation 
process be expanded to include states, intergovernmental organizations 
and non-state actors, especially NGOs.99 Approaching the subject of 
CIL and human rights from feminist and Afrocentric perspectives, she 
argues that human rights law challenges the doctrine of customary in-
ternational law and its exclusive state-centric orientation.100 Globaliza-
tion and cosmopolitan citizenship form the theoretical basis of connec-
tivity herein, whereas for Professor Gunning, a feminist and Afrocentric 
lens leads to interconnectivity. Under either view, the logical extension 
of a non-state or supra-state interconnectivity is to open the CIL forma-
tion process to non-state actors.101 
Having arrived at the position that an exclusively state-centric view 
of CIL is no longer viable, Professor Gunning proposes a more expan-
sive universe of participants in CIL formation. Perhaps because of the 
more communitarian approach that she takes, she does not address di-
rectly the inclusion of individuals. Rather, she proposes that CIL law-
making potential be extended to international organizations and 
NGOs.102 
Although Professor Gunning does not arrive at the inclusion of indi-
viduals in CIL formation, her contribution to the current Article is nota-
ble because it articulates concrete proposals for including non-state ac-
tors. For example, she argues for an NGO certification process similar 
                                                          
96. Paust, Nature, Sources and Evidences, supra note 92. 
97. Id. at 147. 
98. Paust, Reality of Private Rights, supra note 92, at 1246. 
99. Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Hu-
man Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 213 (1991). 
100. Id. at 212. Gunning argues that “a feminist perspective represents the ability to ‘act in 
concert.’” Id. at 218 (quoting H. ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 44 (1969)). In her view, this intercon-
nectivity demands that each nation increasingly consider the interests of all others. Id. at 220. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 222–34. 
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to the consultative status granted to NGOs prior to their recognition be-
fore Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) bodies.103 Professor 
Gunning points to ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV),104 which, at the 
time of her article, provided the requirements for NGOs seeking to re-
ceive consultative status. She argues that NGOs meeting these or similar 
guidelines should be seen as participants, “on a par with states,” in de-
termining the content of CIL.105 
5. Doctrine Change, Yes; NGOs, No 
Influenced by field work in Kosovo, Professor Julie Mertus also has 
expressed the view that a more inclusive international law process is de-
sirable.106 Her position differs from that of Professor Gunning, however, 
due to the skepticism she has expressed about NGOs.107 While she ad-
vances a non-state based, participatory role in CIL, she is cautious about 
NGOs serving as a proxy for civil society.108 Her concern with a model 
for expanding CIL that would rely on NGOs in the manner Professor 
Gunning proposes is that there is already existing evidence that the 
ECOSOC rules for NGO consultative status favor some types of NGOs 
over others. Professor Mertus remarks, “ECOSOC itself has noted that 
its practices are far from perfect and that non-mainstream and Third 
World NGOs in particular may face a disadvantage at gaining access 
and rights of participation in such intergovernmental arenas.”109 In addi-
tion, similar to the position adopted in this Article, Professor Mertus is 
concerned that even if a wholly fair and inclusive process for NGO con-
sultation could be devised, looking to NGOs to assess the beliefs and 
                                                          
103. Id. at 230–31. 
104. E.S.C. Res. 1296 (XLIV), U.N. Doc. E/4548 (May 27, 1968). This resolution has been 
updated since Professor Gunning’s article was published in 1991. The updated position on the 
relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations can be found in 
E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, U.N. Doc. E/1996/96 (July 25, 1996). 
105. Gunning, supra note 99, at 232. 
106. Julie Mertus, Considering Nonstate Actors in the New Millennium: Toward Expanded 
Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 537 
(2000).  
107. Id. at 561 (citing Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Hu-
man Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1335 
(1999); Julie Mertus, Human Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, in THE 
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 433 (Burns H. Weston & Steven P. Marks eds., 
1999); Julie Mertus, Doing Democracy Differently: The Transformative Potential of Human 
Rights NGOs in Transnational Civil Society, 1998-1999 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 205 (1998-
99)). 
108. Mertus, supra note 106, at 561. 
109. Id. at 562. 
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expectations of individuals is imperfect110 since they may distort, dis-
guise, or hide from view the difference and dissent that would be of 
paramount importance in assessments of the content of CIL.111  
6. Private Actors in Other Areas of International Law 
The body of literature thus far reviewed under the rubric of possibil-
ity relates directly and obviously to the project at hand. Each of the 
schools and authors herein described has provided some insights into 
the participation of individuals in the process of CIL formation. As 
stated previously, this appears to be the entirety of the foundational lit-
erature. What is evident is that the concept of including individuals in 
CIL formation is largely under-theorized and underdeveloped. 
Before proceeding to the theory and justification for the inclusion of 
individuals, one additional piece of scholarship bears mention for its 
relevance through analogy to this Article. Professor Janet Koven Levit, 
in a recent article, has exposed what she calls “bottom-up lawmak-
ing”112 in trade-finance communities. She examines the rule-to-law 
making that transpires as the rule-setting processes engaged in by 
groups of private actors (individuals, banks, multinational corporations) 
and public actors in the trade finance sector congeal into hard law with 
legal consequences.113 For example, the rules set out in the Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) are created by 
private bankers who organize through the International Chamber of 
Commerce. Despite the fact that the customary rules and practices ar-
ticulated by this group are created by private individuals, rather than 
policy makers or states, and are not statutory law, courts in the United 
States and elsewhere frequently use them to decide letter-of-credit dis-
putes.114 
Professor Levit observes that the process by which the rules set out 
by these private groups coalesce and slowly harden into law bears a 
                                                          
110. Id. at 561. 
111. For further discussion on the role of NGOs, see infra Section V.C.2.  
112. This term has been used by other commentators to refer to sub-state or sub-international 
organization law-making. See, e.g., BALAKRISHNANA RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM 
BELOW: DEVELOPMENTS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003); 
BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS & CÉSAR RODRIGUEZ-GARAVITO, LAW AND GLOBALIZATION 
FROM BELOW (2005); JORDAN PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATEs 21 
n.10 (2003). 
113. See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of 
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005). 
114. Id. at 128. 
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strong likeness to the process of CIL formation. Nonetheless, she ob-
serves the traditional CIL doctrine and its attendant state-centric ap-
proach and concludes that the bottom-up law making she describes can-
not therefore be CIL formation. For Professor Levit, because the actors 
engaged in this formation process are private actors – in some instances 
individuals – the process in which they are engaged cannot, by defini-
tion, be CIL formation.115 
Rather than push against the state-centric approach to CIL, she opts 
instead to argue for the emergence of a new category of law or law mak-
ing. In this way, Professor Levit appears to have adopted the sover-
eignty paradigm to which Professor D’Amato has referred.116 Some may 
observe that the phenomena Professor Levit describes may be distin-
guished from the processes with which this Article concerns itself. It 
might be said that her work observes and comments upon private inter-
national law or transactional law while this Article addresses paradig-
matically public international law. However, Professor Levit herself ar-
gues quite persuasively that these classifications are not easily 
maintained, especially in light of her work.117 It might also be said that 
the rules set by the actors Professor Levit observes affect only the actors 
who create them, or at least only that type of actor (e.g., bankers gener-
ally), while CIL, and especially the CIL of human rights, affects all 
people everywhere. Again, Professor Levit herself wouljd reject this 
distinction, as she aptly points out that the rules-come-law she describes 
have effects on people far beyond those who engage in making them.118 
There are, however, key differences between Professor Levit’s bot-
tom-up law making and the inclusion of individuals in the formation of 
the CIL of human rights. First, in at least some of the contexts she de-
scribes, the rules set by individuals and private actors have been recog-
nized by adjudicating bodies as law.119 This is quite different from the 
current state of CIL. There is no identifiable precedent in which a court 
consulted the expectations or beliefs of individuals as to the content of 
the CIL of human rights. The second key difference is that the rule-
makers featured in Professor Levit’s article are a very small set of peo-
ple in comparison to the universe affected by their rules.120 This results 
                                                          
115. Id. at 130. 
116. D’Amato, supra note 13.  
117. Levit, supra note 113, at 189–194. 
118. See id. at 131. 
119. See id. at 128. 
120. See id. at 131. 
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in a democratic deficit to which Professor Levit devotes considerable 
thought. In contrast, the inclusion of individuals in the CIL formation 
process would increase democratic participation in law making. 
Most striking about Professor Levit’s article, however, is that the in-
sights and motivations in observing a bottom-up approach to interna-
tional law are very similar to those at work in this Article. It is fascinat-
ing that such work is being conceived in areas of international law that 
are traditionally seen as so dissimilar.121 
The body of work discussed in this Section is rich and imaginative.122 
Each, in some form or another, thinks beyond the exclusively state-
oriented formulation of CIL. Perhaps the German Historical School’s 
position that opinio juris is the opinion of the people gave inspiration to 
the New Haven School’s realist observation that individuals currently 
do participate in CIL formation. It is certainly true that the New Haven 
School’s approach to international law and the observations made by its 
contributors regarding the participation of individuals in CIL, and inter-
national law generally, have provided valuable insights for Professors 
Chen, Paust, Gunning, and Levit, each of whom in turn provide their 
own very useful contributions to the current Article. Professors Chen 
and Paust further the realists’ insight that individuals already do con-
tribute to CIL formation. Professor Gunning pushes for a role for NGOs 
and intergovernmental organizations. Finally, Professor Levit’s work 
observes private parties, including individuals, participating in “bottom-
up law making” that is very much like custom formation, though in ar-
eas of trade finance. 
Missing throughout this foundational literature is both a theoretical un-
derpinning for the proposition that individuals should be recognized in CIL 
formation doctrine and a thorough consideration of how this might be ac-
complished, both doctrinally and in practice. The remainder of this Article 
will venture to fill these gaps.  
                                                          
121. See Christiana Ochoa, Advancing the Language of Human Rights in a Global Economic 
Order: An Analysis of a Discourse, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 57, 60–62 (2003). 
122. It should be noted that this Section has likely not been exhaustive. There are related lit-
eratures that are highly relevant to the present Article. The proliferating literature on soft-law is 
one example. See, e.g.,  COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). Thank you to Henry Steiner 
for this insight.  
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III. DOCTRINAL BASES FOR THE INCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS IN CIL 
The following Section will provide theoretical justification for in-
cluding the individual in the CIL formation process. It will do this in 
two parts. The first is a doctrinal justification and the second is a social 
and philosophical justification. The doctrinal justification will point to a 
pair of under-recognized disjunctures present in current international 
law doctrine. First, it will demonstrate that the various roles individuals 
currently play in international law make it odd at best that individuals 
are not recognized as participants in CIL formation. Second, it will ar-
gue that, especially in the area of human rights, the failure to recognize 
individuals contributes to some of the most widely recognized failings 
of CIL doctrine. Including individuals likely would add no greater com-
plexity to the doctrine, but it may well help to alleviate some of the 
most-cited failings of CIL. 
After this Section establishes a doctrinal exigency for including the 
individual, Section IV will delve into the current social condition of in-
dividuals to ask whether there are deeper philosophical justifications for 
their inclusion in CIL. This Section will discuss three intertwined phe-
nomena: globalization, cosmopolitanism, and transnationalism. In so 
doing, it will observe that the philosophical underpinnings of CIL doc-
trine, so bounded in Westphalian notions of state sovereignty, have been 
corroded to such extents that, at least in the area of human rights, ex-
cluding the individual from CIL formation renders CIL doctrine some-
what incoherent. This incoherency is likely to increase over time, as 
globalization, cosmopolitanism, and transnationalism continue to take 
hold in the human imagination and further tangibly manifest them-
selves. 
Before proceeding further a caveat is in order. The remainder of this 
Article will address that portion of CIL that has been called the CIL of 
human rights. This cabining is necessary, not because it is likely that the 
inclusion of individuals will not hold some import in other areas of in-
ternational law (indeed, it is likely that it will), but rather for the pur-
pose of simplifying a rather complex examination of the necessity and 
utility of including individuals in the CIL formation process. Thus, the 
CIL of human rights will be discussed herein as an illustrative example. 
An examination of other applications of these ideas must be left to an-
other author or another time. 
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A. International Law Doctrine 
1. Individuals as Subjects of International Law 
States were once thought to be the only subjects of international 
law.123 In other words, states were thought to be the exclusive holders of 
rights and obligations under international law. If ever this assumption 
was a realistic description of international law,124 it no longer is. Rather, 
individuals have come to be recognized as the subjects of and partici-
pants in international law and as such are believed to possess rights and 
duties under international law.125 
For some time, authors argued vigorously that individuals were the 
objects of international law.126 The view that individuals were mere ob-
jects of international law was the presiding understanding of the posi-
tion of the individual.127 In essence, this view held that: 
[F]irst, that the individual is not a subject or person of this law; 
that he has no rights and duties whatsoever under it or that he 
cannot invoke it for his protection nor violate its rules. Secondly, 
this doctrine predicates that, as object, the individual is but a 
thing from the point of view of this law or that he is benefited or 
restrained by this law only insofar and to the extent that it makes 
it the right or the duty of states to protect his interests or to regu-
late his conduct within their respective jurisdictions through their 
                                                          
123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. II, 
introductory notes (1987) (“In the past it was sometimes assumed that individuals and corpora-
tions, companies or other juridical persons created by the laws of a state, were not persons under 
(or subjects of) international law.”); see also 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 140–41 (3d ed. 1957) (“[The] injured individual is merely the peg on which the State hangs 
its claim. It is the State which has been injured in the person of its subject. By asserting the claim 
of a subject, the home State demands respect for international law which has been violated by the 
injury inflicted on its national.”). 
124. Some commentators have argued that states have never been the exclusive subjects of in-
ternational law. Lung-chu Chen, for example, refers to this paradigm as the “Vattelian fiction” 
(referencing Emmeric de Vattel’s well-known dictum that an injury to an individual is an injury 
to that person’s state) and points to a number of examples to substantiate his position. For exam-
ple, he states, “The transnational proscriptions of piracy, war crimes, and the slave trade, for ex-
ample, were clearly directed to the individual.” CHEN, supra note 85, at 77.  
125. For arguments that the individual has become a subject of international law, see Edwin 
W. Tucker, Has the Individual Become the Subject of International Law?, 34 U. CIN. L. REV. 341 
(1965); Sean MacBride, Conference of European Jurists on “The Individual and the State,” 3 
INT’L LAW. 603 (1969). 
126. See George Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law, 46 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 428 (1952). 
127. Id. at 428. 
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domestic laws. It predicates, further, that the individual as such, 
or as object, has no international right or claim against states to 
be made by them an object of their international rights and duties 
or to be treated by them according to international law once they 
have in fact made him an object thereof. Rather, it holds, the in-
dividual must look to states also in these respects....This theory 
maintains, thus, that men have no standing whatsoever as men in 
this law.128  
At the time that the object theory of the individual was established, it 
was such because “the very nature of international law necessitate[d] 
this view.”129 By the early 1950s, the grounds for the object theory of 
the individual were significantly eroded and rested only on the circular 
argument that an individual is an object under international law because 
international law treats the individual as an object.130 At this same time, 
a subject theory of the individual was increasingly advanced, mostly 
with specific reference to the fundamental shifts in the design of inter-
national law following World War II.131 This is in part because of the 
recognition, at least from the time of the Nuremberg Tribunals, that in-
dividuals also are bound by international law. 
By the time the Restatement (Third) was drafted, it was widely ac-
knowledged that the status of the individual had moved beyond that of 
mere object and was no longer akin to the status of rivers, cattle or real 
property.132 Individuals may now be seen as the subjects of international 
law, holding rights and obligations thereunder. Readers are now urged to 
recall a basic understanding of customary law doctrine: The essence of cus-
                                                          
128. Id. at 428–29. This theory was widely accepted at the time of Manner’s article. In foot-
note 2 of his article, he provides ample citations for both express and tacit acceptance of this posi-
tion.  
129. Id. at 429. 
130. Id. 
131. This theory was advanced even before World War II, on the observation that with re-
spect to at least three groups of people–pirates, slaves and fishermen–international law incontro-
vertibly treated individuals as subjects of international law. See Philip Marshall Brown, The Indi-
vidual and International Law, 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 532, 533–34 (1924). This editorial is a very 
early and strong critique of the state-centric power orientation in international law advanced by 
Bodin, Vattel and Grotius. Id. at 534. The majority of the literature regarding the status of the in-
dividual in international law, whether defending the object theory or observing a palpable shift to 
a subject theory, appeared after World War II. See, e.g., Aage Nørgaard, THE POSITION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962), reviewed in 12 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1056 (1963). 
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. II, intro-
ductory notes (1987). 
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tomary law is that it is born from the conduct and beliefs of those whom it 
binds. 
2. Individuals as Participants in International Law 
While the debate about the proper status of individuals in interna-
tional law has apparently settled, it is worth noting that underlying de-
bates about the status of the individual are still relevant to the subject 
matter of this Article. For example, Rosalyn Higgins once suggested 
that the subject/object dichotomy is confusing in the context of interna-
tional law. Rejecting the positivist school’s approach to international 
law as a set of rules, and building on the work of McDougal, Chen, and 
Lasswell, which views law as process, she argues that there are not ob-
jects and subjects in decision making processes. Rather, there are a vari-
ety of participants. “Individuals are participants, along with govern-
ments, international institutions and private groups.”133 Higgins 
observes that it is necessarily the case that individuals will only partici-
pate in processes that are relevant to individuals. As such, “they are 
simply part and parcel of the fabric of international law, representing the 
claims that are naturally made by individual participants in contradis-
tinction to those presented by state participants.”134 
Having ascended out of the status of object, the role of individuals 
has taken on significance and continues to be relevant. Much of this dis-
cussion has occurred using the conceptual thinking and terminology of 
the rights and duties of individuals. Some, however, have adopted the 
process-oriented approach of the New Haven School.135 In a robust 
analysis of the role of the individual in international law, this process-
oriented approach is essential, as it allows both for thinking beyond the 
rights and obligations of the individual in the context of conflicts and 
for thinking about the various other functions in which individuals 
might participate.136 
The roles individuals play in the intelligence, promotion, invocation, 
and appraisal functions are non-controversial and are of less importance 
to the central argument of this Article. The application function is 
largely within the ambit of adjudicators. Of particular interest for this 
                                                          
133. Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law, 24 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11, 16 (1978). 
134. Id. 
135. See id. 
136. See supra note 80 for an elaboration of the seven functions in international law process 
articulated by Casswell, McDougal and Reisman. 
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Article, then, are the prescription and termination functions, which may 
be thought of as very similar, as they both relate to the making and un-
making of law. 
3. Individuals and Prescription  
a. Individuals and prescription by invocation 
To the extent that the prescription function is influenced and affected 
by the invocation function, it is important to recognize that individuals 
may now enforce human rights law at the international and national 
level. Individuals may enforce human rights through domestic law, 
through constitutional provisions integrating human rights into a given 
country’s constitution,137 or through statutory mechanisms such as the 
Alien Tort Claims Act in the United States and universal jurisdiction 
statutes. Regional human rights systems provide for individuals to sub-
mit petitions and claims based on human rights violations. For example, 
in 2001, the European Court of Human Rights registered 13,858 appli-
cants–so many, in fact, that the court’s ability to adequately handle le-
gitimate claims was called into question.138 The Inter-American Com-
mission and Court also allow petitions from individuals.139 Individuals 
also may now make claims based on human rights violations before 
non-regional international bodies. The United Nations accepts individ-
ual communications before four treaty bodies: the Human Rights Com-
mittee (HRC),140 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation (CERD),141 the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW),142 and the Convention Against Torture 
                                                          
137. Colombia’s constitution, for example, provides individuals with the ability to make 
claims based on any constitutional rights, including those international human rights that have 
been incorporated thereby. See CONSTITUTION OF 1991 (Colom.). 
138. European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+the+Court/ (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2007).  
139. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 44, Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
140. This may be accomplished through use of the First Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 
1966). 
141. See Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination art. 14, G.A. Res. 2106 
(XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965). 
142. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 6, 1999). 
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(CAT),143 and may soon also accept individual communications under 
the Convention on Migrant Workers.144 The International Criminal 
Court is now yet another venue through which individuals may partici-
pate in the invocation function in the area of human rights.145 
b. Individuals and prescription in the area of treaty law 
It has been argued and demonstrated elsewhere that non-state actors, 
including individuals, play a role in the making of treaties, and in par-
ticular human rights treaties.146 Article 71 of the United Nations Charter 
provides a formalized role for civil society through consultation with 
NGOs. The relationship between NGOs and the United Nations is now 
regulated by a 1996 ECOSOC resolution.147 This relationship contem-
plates a role for NGOs to participate in a variety of means, each of 
which may influence the substance and form of resulting resolutions and 
treaties.148 According to Caroline E. Schwitter Marsiaj: 
[A]ctive participation of NGOs in the development of new trea-
ties and standards has always been and continues to be an impor-
tant activity of NGOs. 
NGOs are frequently instrumental in the development and draft-
                                                          
143. See Convention Against Torture art. 22, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 
10, 1984). 
144. See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families art. 77, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990). 
This provision will begin to operate when a requisite ten states have accepted this provision. For a 
description of the procedures cited above, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Human Rights Treaty Bodies – Petitions, Complaints Procedures Under the 
Human Rights Bodies, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/1503.htm (last visited Aug. 
23, 2007). 
145. International Criminal Court, Participation of Victims in Proceedings, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/victimsissues/victimsparticipation.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2007). 
146. A decade ago, Steve Charnovitz published a particularly thorough elaboration of the role 
of NGOs in international governance. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs 
and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 184 n.1 (1997) (citing Paul Ghils, Inter-
national Civil Society: International Non-governmental Organizations in the International Sys-
tem, 44 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 417 (1992); A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions in the Development of International Environmental Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61 (1993); 
The Growing Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT’L L. PROC. 413 (1995); 
Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50 (1997)). Charnovitz has recently revisited 
the role of NGOs in international law. See Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations 
and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348 (2006). 
147. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 104.  
148. ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 provides for written and oral consultation with ECOSOC 
and its subsidiary bodies within the competence of the NGOs and also for consultative roles with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Id. ¶¶ 18, 28. 
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ing of human rights norms. Examples of NGO involvement in 
human rights standard-setting are plentiful and well documented. 
Often NGOs act as catalysts in the development of new human 
rights standards and participate actively throughout the prepara-
tion of human rights treaties…. In some bodies, participation of 
NGOs in standard-setting is a recognized practice….149 
Furthermore, it is neither the contention of this Article that NGOs ac-
tually make treaties, nor that NGOs are a perfect mechanism for the in-
volvement of individuals in international governance. The relevant point 
is that individuals, through NGOs, have a formalized role in the treaty 
making process. 
A recent example of individuals participating in setting standards in 
the UN system has been described by Professor David Weissbrodt. Pro-
fessor Weissbrodt served as the principal drafter of the United Nations’ 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.150 In a recent arti-
cle, he describes the process by which the norms were formed.151 Indi-
viduals, separate from NGOs, were among the participants in the con-
sultation process that led to the creation of the Norms.152 The Norms are 
not yet and may not ever become treaty, but the process by which they 
were created is significant and is not at all unusual. Thus, especially in 
the area of human rights treaty making, individuals have had a formal, 
active, and direct role in standard setting and law making. Some may 
argue this has been the case from the outset.153  
                                                          
149. Caroline E. Schwitter Marsiaj, The Role of International NGOs in the Global Govern-
ance of Human Rights: Challenging the Democratic Deficit, 121 SCHWEIZER STUDIEN ZUM 
INTERNATIONALEN RECHT 1, 24–25 (2004) (Switz.). 
150. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 
2003). 
151. David Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 68 (2005). 
152. For a list of contributors, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights, Stakeholder Submissions to the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Re-
gards to Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/contributions.htm (last visited Aug. 
23, 2007). 
153. See Marsiaj, supra note 149, at 59, 84. 
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c. Individuals and non-treaty prescription in other areas of 
international law  
It also has been argued and demonstrated that non-state actors, in-
cluding individuals, in other areas of international law participate in rule 
making in respect to their particular areas of interest. As discussed pre-
viously, Professor Levit has discussed three instances in the area of 
trade finance in which private actors make rules. In addition to making 
the rules, these actors also enforced the rules they participated in mak-
ing.154 While she takes the view that this rule making is not the same as 
making CIL, the rule making in which these actors are engaged does 
have the force of real law. Thus, in a distinct area of international law, 
the parties most affected by that law have a recognized and formalized 
role in creating the rules and law which matter to them. 
Absent from accepted doctrine and even from the literature on CIL is 
a recognized role for the individual in the CIL formation process. Given 
the various locations where individuals do engage in the prescription 
function, this gap seems to be an uneven treatment of the law and of in-
dividuals. This Article will assert below that attention to this gap may 
help to alleviate some aspects of discord in CIL doctrine.  
B. Human Rights Doctrine 
1. Human Rights Doctrine is Oriented Toward the Individual 
Perhaps more than in other areas of international law, including indi-
viduals in the making of the CIL of human rights is reasonable. The 
conceptual and legal shift within international law from a situation in 
which individuals were objects with no legal personality to a situation in 
which individuals are seen as subjects and active participants occured in 
large part as a result of the creation of the human rights system and doc-
trine following World War II. As has been discussed previously herein, 
it is incontrovertible that individuals possess actionable rights under 
modern human rights law.155 Individuals also participate in the making 
of standards, rules, and law in the area of human rights treaties. This is 
the only logical approach to individuals within a doctrine that is de-
signed, in large part, to protect individuals from human rights violations 
that their own states may commit. 
                                                          
154. See Levit, supra note 114, at 128. 
155. See supra Section III.A. 
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This orientation of human rights doctrine–an orientation that is nec-
essarily cautious about the potential of states to commit all manner of 
human rights violations–inherently recognizes that states will not al-
ways behave in accordance with the provisions found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, or subsequent 
human rights treaties, norms and declarations. This skepticism can be 
found in every admonishment to states to observe, protect, ensure, or 
otherwise provide their populations with the human rights enumerated 
in these various documents. It is partially for this reason that non-state 
actors have from the outset been granted consultative status within the 
United Nations on human rights matters.156 In such an atmosphere of 
skepticism toward states, it is odd at best that states would be left with 
the sole and exclusive domain over the creation of the CIL of human 
rights. This is especially so given that the skepticism toward states is 
perpetually proven to be warranted, as numerous state-perpetuated hu-
man rights violations occur annually. 
The current situation is one in which states, including regular viola-
tors of human rights doctrine and the actors that human rights treaties 
have had in mind as potential violators, are monopoly holders of the 
formal authority to create CIL, even in the area of human rights. This 
condition is founded on a commitment to the volunteerist, or consensu-
alist conception of international law.157 It is apparent that this concep-
tion of international law does not fit well with human rights doctrine. In 
fact, an often-cited attraction of CIL, especially in regard to jus cogens 
norms, is its ability to bind states that have not voluntarily taken on par-
ticular human rights obligations through treaties. This is among the rea-
sons that custom is viewed as the “Achilles’ heel of the consensualist 
outlook.”158 
The participation of individuals in the formation of CIL also poten-
tially would challenge the volunteerist principle. Perhaps this would be 
the case, however, only in a confined universe of cases. In cases in 
which the expectations and beliefs of individuals are discernable and are 
found to have coalesced into custom, this information would be factored 
                                                          
156. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 104. 
157. The volunteerist, or consensualist conception of international law holds that in order to 
be bound by international law, states (traditionally the exclusive subjects of international law) 
must consent to be bound by that law. See generally O.A. ELIAS & CHIN L. LIM, THE PARADOX 
OF CONSENSUALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998). For a critique of the consent theory, see 
D’AMATO, supra note 39, at 187–99. 
158. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 
413, 433 (1983). 
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together with the traditional objective and subjective state elements in 
determining the content of CIL. Consider the following hypothetical ex-
amples. 
In the first hypothetical situation, the human rights norm being con-
sidered (for example, a prohibition on genocide) is one about which in-
dividuals and their states appear to be in agreement and a sufficient 
number of states will have behaved with the necessary uniformity for 
the requisite time period such that the prohibition on genocide can be 
declared CIL. An inquiry into the expectations and beliefs of the popu-
lation will show that there is a sufficiently uniform expectation or belief 
that they should be protected from genocide. In these cases, the volun-
teerist principle is not challenged–the state consents to be bound by law 
which prohibits genocide and individuals do not challenge that position. 
In a second hypothetical situation, however, a reviewing body look-
ing at the words and actions of only states would come to the conclusion 
that a given norm has not risen to the level of CIL. If the reviewing 
body were to peer through the level of the state and the behavior 
thereof, it would find that individuals have very much come to believe 
in their own possession of the rights captured by the particular norm un-
der consideration. 
Actual examples in which this might be the case are not difficult to 
imagine or come by. The current state of Myanmar (Burma) serves as 
an excellent example of a state that denies to its population the protec-
tion of human rights. Without more investigation, Myanmar is likely to 
serve as an exception that must be accounted for in any consideration of 
whether any given norm has become CIL. A large enough number of 
Myanmars, taken together, can serve to ensure that any given norm can-
not be shown to have attained the requisite level of uniform acceptance 
to become custom. Under current CIL formation doctrine, this would be 
the result even if there is existing evidence that the people of Myanmar 
(or of the Myanmars of the world) have come to believe that they pos-
sess human rights and hold expectations that their human rights should 
be observed. 
This is not merely a hypothetical situation posed for the purpose of il-
lustration. The sitting government of Myanmar is signatory to no human 
rights treaties save CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.159 Myanmar is also infamous for its ongoing violations of human 
                                                          
159. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Rati-
fications of the Principal Human Rights Treaties as of July 14, 2006,  
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/status.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2007). 
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rights.160 If a reviewing body were to look no further than the instance 
of Myanmar, it would have no choice but to see Myanmar’s words and 
actions as an example of a state where a given norm of human rights has 
not yet taken hold. For a large set of international law scholars, this 
would serve as evidence that the given norm may not be CIL. There is 
significant and mounting evidence, however, that the people of Myan-
mar believe they possess human rights and expect those rights to be pro-
tected.161 Under current CIL formation doctrine, this information cannot 
be considered, despite its obvious relevance. 
The case of Myanmar is an extreme example, but it is not alone as an 
example of a state that does not observe human rights in words or in act-
ions. There are other instances in which human rights doctrine seems to 
dictate that individuals be consulted in determinations of the content of 
CIL. The action versus words problem, so often noted in the CIL litera-
ture,162 serves as a valuable conceptual jumping off point. 
This problem refers to the questions that arise when a state outwardly 
condemns a given practice or repeatedly signs on to human rights trea-
ties, declarations, etc., prohibiting that practice while also engaging in 
actions that contradict their statements. For example, a state may con-
demn torture repeatedly while actively engaging in torture.163 The con-
tradiction created by the conflicting actions and words may serve to 
denigrate or degrade the status of a norm against torture as prohibited by 
CIL. This is especially the case under the traditional view of CIL, which 
holds that only the physical acts of states count.164 It is, of course, plaus-
ible that the declarative acts of states and the opinions and expectations 
of individuals might well stand in agreement in condemning torture. 
Nonetheless, if individuals are not taken into account, and physical acts 
are given greater weight than declarative acts, then the continuing 
physical acts of torture by states may serve to denigrate a customary 
prohibition against torture. Again, this seems an odd result, especially in 
                                                          
160. For recent reports of such violations, see Human Rights Watch, Burma, 
http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=asia&c=burma (last visited Aug. 23, 2007).  
161. There is currently a Burmese democratic constitution drafting process underway. The 
current draft of the constitution recognizes the rights of Burmese people under human rights in-
struments. Burmese Draft Consitution (on file with author). In addition, the well known Alien 
Tort Claims Act case between unnamed Burmese peasants and Unocal provides evidence that 
individuals within this country believe themselves to possess human rights that their state denies 
to them. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
162. For a recent discussion of this literature, see Guzman, supra note 43, at 116–17. 
163. Id. at 152. 
164. See D’AMATO, supra note 39, at 88. But see WOLFKE, supra note 16, at 84 (stating that 
all resolutions constitute acts of conduct and can lead to the formation of customary law). 
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an international order predicated on a commitment to democratic par-
ticipation and one that aims to protect individuals from human rights 
violations. 
2. Human Rights Doctrine Requires Information from Individuals 
as the Doctrine Evolves 
Human rights, whether created by treaty or CIL, are designed to af-
fect and protect individuals. In order for human rights doctrine to re-
main vibrant and coherent, it is necessary to include individuals in con-
siderations of the content of human rights law, regardless of whether 
that law is made by way of treaty or custom.  
Institutionalizing the inclusion of public opinion, after all, is among 
the rationales behind granting NGOs consultative status within the 
United Nations165 and also within the Council of Europe.166 The Council 
of Europe is very explicit about this rationale and states that “initiatives, 
ideas and suggestions emanating from civil society can be considered as 
a true expression of European citizens.”167 Commentators may do well 
to similarly include discussions of public opinion and expectation in 
their assertions that a given norm has coalesced into CIL. Reviewing 
bodies attempting to determine the content of CIL also may see the ne-
cessity of expanding their own competence to include peering through 
the veil of state sovereignty to ask about the beliefs and expectations of 
individuals in respect to human rights, rather than focusing solely on the 
behavior of states. 
C. CIL Doctrine  
A natural question that arises at this point, even if the reader has been 
convinced that characteristics of both international law generally and 
human rights doctrine more specifically form strong bases for including 
individuals in CIL formation, is whether the doctrine of CIL itself forms 
a basis for this shift. 
                                                          
165. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 104, ¶ 20. 
166. Comm. of Ministers, Council of Eur., Participatory Status for International Non-
governmental Organisations with the Council of Europe, Res(2003)8 pmbl. (Nov. 19, 2003), 
available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/ngo/public/participatory_status/resolution_%282003%298/Resolution_200
3_8.asp#TopOfPage. 
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Common criticisms of CIL include assertions that it suffers a legiti-
macy crisis.168 Ben Chigara has presented a very thorough accounting of 
the reasons for this crisis. In his view, the state practice + opinio juris = 
CIL formula fails to describe the current international legal system. 
Chigara reminds us that Article 38(1)(b) was originally drafted in 1920 
and integrated into the Statute of the ICJ without change in 1945.169 At 
the time the text was drafted, the state was the only recognized subject 
of international law. The volunteerist principle of international law was 
also largely unchallenged. Both of these essential premises of interna-
tional law, however, have largely eroded since the text of Article 
38(1)(b) was drafted.170 In arriving at this conclusion, Chigara points to 
many of the same factors already discussed in this Article, including the 
rise of the international human rights regime, the proliferation of NGOs 
and IGOs as international legal actors, and the creation of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, as evidence that state sovereignty and state con-
sent do not play the unique role they once did.171 
Given this fundamental change in conditions, Chigara argues that the 
twin-pronged approach of Article 38(1)(b) to CIL formation no longer 
fully represents the framework used in the decisions of the ICJ.172 He 
believes that the confusion surrounding CIL may be adduced as evi-
dence that there are blind spots in the formulation, and in the interpreta-
tion of the formulation, of CIL. “These blind spots threaten the determi-
nacy, coherence and legitimacy of customary international law.”173 As 
applied to the ICJ and CIL, Chigara seeks to examine whether the free 
play of the text174 of Article 38(1)(b) has contributed to the perceived 
legitimacy deficiencies in CIL. 
The reader is urged now to recall the realists’ observation discussed 
earlier herein that individuals, in very real ways, currently participate in 
the formation of CIL.175 Although individuals currently do participate in 
CIL formation, the current text and/or interpretation of Article 38(1)(b) 
do(es) not allow the ICJ or any other reviewing body using the formula-
tion provided by Article 38(1)(b) to outwardly recognize, acknowledge, 
                                                          
168. See CHIGARA, supra note 27. 
169. Id. at 67. 
170. Id. at 73. 
171. Id. at 73–88. 
172. See id. 
173. Id. at 136. 
174. The “free play of texts” refers to the Derridian idea that “often our use of language re-
veals that we mean more than we say, and also often say more than we mean.” Id. 
175. See supra Section II.C.6. 
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or discuss this participation as relevant in their decision making process. 
This can result in a situation in which the ICJ has to engage in the free 
play of texts, thereby obscuring the true grounds for their decisions. 
It is not the assertion of this Article that the failure to formally in-
clude individuals in CIL formation is the only reason for the legitimacy 
deficit resulting from the decline of state sovereignty and volunteerism. 
Such an assertion would be overly grand, to be sure. As this discussion 
has shown, however, international law now recognizes individuals as 
subjects. Individuals are protected by and are bound by human rights. 
At the same time, at least the two basic premises of CIL discussed 
above have been significantly eroded since the Statute of the ICJ was 
drafted. The result is that the inability to formally recognize information 
from individuals when determining the content of CIL contributes to 
this legitimacy deficit. This is exacerbated by the fact that individuals 
are de facto participants in this process. 
IV. MODERN SOCIAL/PHILOSOPHICAL BASES FOR INCLUDING THE 
INDIVIDUAL: GLOBALIZATION, COSMOPOLITANISM, 
TRANSNATIONALISM, AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
A. Globalization 
The term “globalization”176 is a term used in many disciplines and 
discourses to describe a broad range of cultural changes that together 
create worldwide interdependence, interaction, and integration, and 
have allowed unprecedented connection between people.177 
Communication, technological development, rapid international 
transportation, and international law, especially in areas of trade and 
human rights, are all markers of and contributors to globalization. 
Globalization is felt as increased interdependence, a sense of living in a 
smaller world and a sense that what happens in one place has potential 
effects in a very distant part of the world. It is brought on not just by the 
                                                          
176. The term globalization has no agreed-upon definition. There is great debate about its 
meaning and content. See, e.g., PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN 
QUESTION: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE (1996); 
PHILLIPPE LEGRAIN, OPEN WORLD: THE TRUTH ABOUT GLOBALIZATION (2003); ROLAND 
ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE (1992); SASKIA 
SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996). 
177. There is an important distinction between internationalization and globalization. See 
DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 52–58 
(1999).  
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technological improvements made in travel, communications, and the 
media, but also as the result of the emergence of regional and global 
agreements and customs, especially when these agreements and customs 
create a consciousness of interconnectedness among people all over the 
world.178 
A widely quoted definition of globalization is put forward by David 
Held and others as “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a 
transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transac-
tions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and im-
pact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks 
of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.”179 
It is this transformation of social relations that is most pertinent to 
this Article. It is precisely this “rapid growth of complex interconnec-
tions and interrelations between states and societies…along with the in-
tersection of national and international forces and processes”180 that pre-
sent largely under-theorized problems for traditional democracy 
discourse.181 
Traditional democratic theory has focused on democracy within the 
nation state and much less on the challenges that arise as a result of 
globalization and the attendant decline of state sovereignty. In the last 
decade, political theorists have begun to ask questions that have real 
significance for legal doctrine and process.182 The results have come in 
the form of fundamental re-thinking about the concept of citizenship 
                                                          
178. The United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights said this about globalization in 
2000: 
From the information superhighway to the international trade in drugs and arms, to 
the phenomenal impact of MacWorld, Nike and the global media, the subject of global-
ization has come to concern all and sundry. At the core of most discussions of the issue 
is the extraordinary explosion of both technology and information, in ways that have 
considerably reduced the twin concepts of time and space. In particular, information and 
communications technology (ICT) has emerged as perhaps the most dominant force in 
the global system of production, albeit with significant ramifications in all other spheres 
of contemporary human existence. 
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its Impact on the Full 
Enjoyment of Human Rights, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (June 15, 2000) (preliminary 
report submitted by J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama). 
179. David Held et al., Rethinking Globalization, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION 
READER 54, 55 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000). 
180. DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER ix (1995). 
181. Id. 
182. David Held has articulated a sampling of these questions. Id. at x; see also Symposium, 
Democracy and the Transnational Private Sector, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 
2008). 
166 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:1 
 
 
and the lock on citizenship and democracy enjoyed until recently by the 
state. This rethinking has resulted in a reemergence183 of a theory of 
cosmopolitan citizenship, cosmopolitan democracy, and “cosmopolitan 
democratic law”184 that draws into question the legitimacy of current 
frameworks for democratic law generally, especially given develop-
ments in international law that rely on notions of democracy and human 
rights.185 
Some legal scholars, including scholars of international law, long ago 
came to the conclusion that changes in international law and the 
changes brought on by globalization create a new condition – a new ter-
rain for individuals: “In traditional international law the individual 
played an inconspicuous part because the international interests of the 
individual and his contacts across the frontier were rudimentary. This is 
no longer the case.”186  
B. Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitan Citizenship  
In a previous writing, the author has presented initial thoughts on the 
emergence of a global community, not merely as a philosophical matter, 
but as a real phenomenon.187 Briefly, that article presents the work of 
social scientists and legal scholars that point to the emergence of a cos-
mopolitan community. 
The identification of the emergence of a global community has led, in 
turn, to observations of an emerging global, or cosmopolitan, citizen-
ship.188 Professor Linda Bosniak, for example, has concluded that 
emerging global identities exist and that viewing the activities pertain-
ing to global identities as acts of citizenship is a choice toward further 
developing transnational identities.189 
                                                          
183. As students of political philosophy will know, cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan citi-
zenship are not new ideas. Immanuel Kant was a great proponent of the idea of universal commu-
nity and cosmopolitanism. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 107–108 
(Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d enlarged ed. 1991). 
184. HELD, supra note 177, at 270–71. 
185. See id. at 99–121; see also James Crawford, Whewell Professor of Int’l Law, Univ. of 
Cambridge, Inaugural Lecture: Democracy in International Law (Mar. 5, 1993) (providing an in-
sightful analysis of the effects of the development of international law on traditional notions of 
state sovereignty). 
186. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 63 (1950). 
187. Ochoa, supra note 57, at 128. 
188. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 
(2000). 
189. Id. at 489. 
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It is not the author’s view that individuals have become de-
nationalized. Nation states will not disappear in the foreseeable future. 
Professor Ann-Marie Slaughter, for example, has argued convincingly 
that the nation state is strong and remains central and important, even 
after the assent of transnationalism and globalization.190 Rather, what is 
important to note is that individuals have added global or cosmopolitan 
identities to their already multi-leveled, or plural, political identities. 
The emergence of a cosmopolitan citizenship creates a new circum-
stance requiring a rethinking of the appropriate locations of citizen par-
ticipation in government and governance.191 This context is relevant to 
the proposal that individuals should be included in the CIL formation 
process. 
C. Transnationalism, the Subaltern, and Globalization from Below  
Another highly relevant and connected social and political phenome-
non is that which has been described and documented under a variety of 
names by scholars of the subaltern, such as Boaventura de Sousa San-
tos, César Rodríguez-Garavito,192 and Balakrishnan Rajagopal.193 This 
approach grasps the richness of globalization and seeks to see and study 
the activities of the “vast set of networks, initiatives, organizations, and 
movements that fight against the economic, social, and political out-
comes of hegemonic globalization.”194 This set of groupings and activi-
ties is another face of globalization–the globalization that occurs outside 
of, and sometimes in reaction to, the neo-liberal and elite-oriented glob-
alization. 
Counter-hegemonic globalization and its attendant legal, illegal, and 
extra-legal activities (which take the form of cross border group forma-
tion, activism, rallies, protests, petitions, etc.) presents new and real op-
                                                          
190. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and 
Disaggregated Democracy (Harvard Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 018), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=283976 (arguing that the emergence of transnational governmental 
networks makes evident the continuing importance and centrality of the state). 
191. See Ochoa, supra note 57, at 136. 
192. See LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005). 
193. See BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).  
194. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social Forum 
as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: 
TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY, supra note 192, at 29. 
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portunities to include the beliefs and expectations of individuals from all 
sectors of the world in respect to human rights. 
D. Participatory Democracy 
The vast discourse on globalization includes questions and theories 
about the effects of globalization on traditional notions of democracy. 
Among the questions asked are whether traditional democracy, occur-
ring within nation states and through representatives, is still a realistic 
narrative of the means by which decisions are made in a globalized 
world, and whether it should be.195 A fuller exploration of the connec-
tions between modern theories of participatory democracy and the par-
ticipation of individuals in CIL formation is necessary.196 
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that the connec-
tions are immediately and intuitively obvious. The origin of the theory 
of participatory democracy is often credited to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
who presented an argument that authority over a people can only be le-
gitimate if it leaves those who obey it as free as they were prior to their 
submitting to that authority. Participatory democracy grants individuals 
the ability to participate in making the laws they must obey.197 
An orientation toward a robust model of positive liberty is at the core 
of individuals participating in CIL formation. This, however, is not a 
radical orientation by any means. Rather, debates over the merits of 
positive versus negative liberty are among the most enduring in modern 
political life. It should also be noted that this orientation simply mirrors 
that adopted by the United Nations and the Council of Europe, both of 
which have institutionalized avenues for direct participation from non-
state actors.198 
                                                          
195. For a more comprehensive set of the questions raised, see HELD, supra note 180, at ix–x.  
196. Interested readers may find a somewhat expanded articulation of these connections in a 
forthcoming article by the author. See Christiana Ochoa, The Relationship of Participatory De-
mocracy to Participatory Law-Formation, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2008). 
197. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 2. Although Rousseau is often credited with the theory of 
participatory democracy, the Athenian model was one of direct democracy. Montesquieu and 
Machiavelli are also cited as having elements of this theory in their writings. See POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: THEORIES, THINKERS, CONCEPTS 358 (Seymour Martin Lipset ed., 2001). 
198. See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 104, ¶ 18.; Comm. of Ministers, Council of Eur., 
Participatory Status for International Non-governmental Organisations with the Council of 
Europe, Res(2003)8 pmbl. (Nov. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/ngo/public/participatory_status/resolution_%282003%298/Resolution_200
3_8.asp#TopOfPage..  
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V. OPERATIONALIZING THE INCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS 
The proposal that individuals ought to be included in the process of 
CIL formation is both theoretically grounded and technically feasible. 
Having addressed the theoretical foundations for this inclusion, the Ar-
ticle will now turn to an all-too-brief discussion of how individuals 
would be included in the CIL formation process.  
Suggesting that individual participation in CIL formation makes the 
leap from being merely the observation of realist scholars to being the 
formal approach followed by scholars and adjudicators when making 
determinations regarding the content of CIL requires consideration of 
how this might be undertaken. This discussion falls into three catego-
ries. The first entails the doctrine itself. It asks whether Article 38 of the 
Statute of the ICJ and Section 102 of the Restatement (Second) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States must be reworded, or whether 
the change proposed herein can be embraced by the current language of 
these provisions. In other words, must this be a textual change, or is it 
potentially an interpretive change? 
The second question asks what should be measured. This Article uses 
the terms “belief” and “expectation” to indicate what it is about indi-
viduals that one would seek to ascertain when seeking to determine the 
content of CIL. It uses these terms tentatively, however. There are vari-
ous meanings for the term “expectation,” for example, and these must 
be explored. Also, there are other elements in respect to individuals that 
may be apt evidence of custom formation. 
The third discussion is an intensely practical one. It asks, if individu-
als are to be included in the CIL formation process, how would this be 
done in practice? How would public belief or public expectation be as-
sessed such that it could be utilized in relevant inquiries into the content 
of CIL? This Section will address these three aspects in turn. 
A. Including Individuals: Textual Change or Statutory 
Interpretation? 
It might be helpful at this point for readers to be reminded of the ex-
isting language of the traditional doctrine regarding secondary sources, 
opinion-evidence, and means of proving whether a rule has become in-
ternational law. Article 38(1) of the ICJ and Section 103 of the Re-
statement are instructive. 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice sets out 
the sources of international law as follows:  
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1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with in-
ternational law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
  a. international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;  
  b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law; 
  c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions; 
  d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.199  
On the evidence of international law, Section 103 of the Restatement 
provides that: 
2. In determining whether a rule has become international law, 
substantial weight is accorded to: 
  a. judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbi-
tral tribunals; 
  b. judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals; 
  c. the writings of scholars; 
  d. pronouncements by states that undertake to state a rule of 
international law, when such pronouncements are not seriously 
challenged by other states.200 
In both instances, the sources of opinion-evidence are very state-
based. It is notable, however, that states are not the only source of evi-
dence. In each case, some individuals play a role in providing evidence 
as to the content of CIL (though admittedly only a very restricted and 
elite group). The point here is certainly not that all individuals fall into 
the definition of “most highly qualified publicists” or even qualify as 
“scholars,” but rather that courts already look to writings of individuals 
as filters on actual custom. Whether that custom about which scholars 
provide information is shaped by the behavior of states or by the norms 
that have taken the shape of law for actual people is not specified. Un-
der either the Restatement approach or the Article 38 approach, scholars 
or jurists may have license to address, or at least are not in any way pre-
                                                          
199.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993 
200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103(2) 
(1987). 
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cluded from addressing, the expectations of people among other consid-
erations, especially in compelling cases. 
In a realistic sense, this may be the best that can be expected. Even 
under current doctrine, the writings, affidavits, and testimony of highly 
qualified international law experts are essential in assisting adjudicatory 
bodies in determining whether state behavior has created law. This 
would certainly continue to be true in the event that public belief and 
expectation come to be included in such determinations. 
To some this may feel unsatisfactory. Perhaps it seems that law-
determining bodies must themselves engage in the collection of evi-
dence about individuals’ expectations. Perhaps only this would be seen 
to satisfy the more direct participation to which this paper makes refer-
ence. 
Even this more radical position on direct participation may not re-
quire textual revisions to Article 38(1)(b) itself. Article 38 does not spe-
cifically state whose “general practice” makes up CIL. And this word-
ing did not result from a lack of attention to the inclusion or exclusion 
of exclusively state-centric language. Rather, early drafts of the text of 
Article 38(1)(b) indicate that an exclusively state-centric formulation 
was explicitly considered but not ultimately adopted. 
The various drafts of Article 38(1)(b) very specifically moved away 
from an exclusively state-centric approach. The text of these drafts, in 
chronological order, is as follows: 
 Proposal by Baron Descamps: 
“[I]nternational custom, being practice between nations ac-
cepted by them as law.”201 
 
Amended text submitted by Mr. Root:  
“[I]nternational custom, being recognized practice between na-
tions accepted by them as law.” 202 
 
Proposals presented by the President (Baron Descamps) and 
Lord Phillimore, as amended by Mr. Ricci-Busatti:  
“[I]nternational custom as evidence of common practice among 
                                                          
201. Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Comm. of Jurists, Proces-Verbaux of 
the Proceedings of the Committee 306 (June 16 – July 24, 1920) (with annexes) (The Hague, 
1920), available at 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/documents/1920.07.24_proces_verbaux/1920.07.04_proces
_verbaux.htm. 
202. Id. at 344. 
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said States, accepted by them as law.”203 
 
Root-Phillimore Plan:  
“International custom, as evidence of a common practice in use 
between nations and accepted by them as law.”204 
 
Text proposed by Drafting Committee, of a draft scheme for the 
establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice:  
“[I]nternational custom, as evidence of a general practice, 
which is accepted as law.” (This version is of particular rele-
vance since it is here that all reference to states and nations dis-
appears from the formulation of CIL.)205 
 
Text adopted in first reading:  
“[I]nternational custom, being the recognition of a general prac-
tice, accepted as law.”206 
 
Draft-Scheme: 
“[I]nternational custom, as evidence of a general practice, 
which is accepted as law.”207 
 
Final text adopted by the committee: 
No change.208 
 
Present Text of Subparagraph 1(b) of Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice: 
“[I]nternational custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law.”209 
The rules of statutory interpretation arguably cut in favor of an inter-
pretation that the “general practice” to which Article 38(1)(b) refers can, 
may, or does include states as well as other actors. Anyone ambitious 
                                                          
203. Id. at 351. 
204. Id. at 548. 
205. Id. at 567. It is both fascinating and frustrating that the Proces-Verbaux of the Proceed-
ings of the Committee includes neither discussion of the reasons for this change nor the argu-
ments surrounding it, if any were made. 
206. Id. at 666. 
207. Id. at 680. 
208. Id. at 730. 
209. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
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enough to take up that position, however, should be aware that it would 
require strong modifications to significant quantities of well established 
commentary on Article 38(1)(b) that has held an exclusively state-
centric view as a central assumption.210 
The Restatement is another matter. While Section 103 allows for the 
participation of an intellectual elite in interpreting CIL, Section 102 is 
clearly state-centric and holds that CIL is the result of “a general and 
consistent practice of states.”211 
This is not to suggest, of course, that the Restatement might not be 
worded quite differently in its next incarnation. The Introductory Note 
to Part II of the Restatement alludes to significant changes in interna-
tional law that were only starting to take hold in the legal imagination at 
the time it was finalized in 1987. It recognizes that while it had histori-
cally been assumed that individuals 
were not persons under (or subjects of) international law…[i]n 
principle…individuals…can have any status, capacity, rights, or 
duties given them by international law or agreement, and in-
creasingly individuals…have been accorded such aspects of per-
sonality in varying measures.212 
This note is particularly provocative in light of the manner in which 
individuals were regarded under the 1967 Restatement Second. In the 
twenty years between 1967 and 1987, individuals moved from being 
treated largely as objects to being recognized as subjects of international 
law.213 It is not a far stretch to imagine that in drafting the next Re-
                                                          
210. Little attention has been given to the state-centric assumption. The basic premise of this 
assumption is the volunteerist view which holds that the international legal system is consensual 
vis-à-vis states. See supra note 158.  
211. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(1987) (emphasis added).  
212. Id. at pt. II, introductory note (emphasis added). 
213. It may be of interest to compare the language of these two Restatements. Restatement 
(Second) states: 
 f. Rights of individuals under international law. International law imposes upon 
states duties with respect to individuals. Thus, it is a violation of international law for a 
state to treat an alien in a manner which does not satisfy the international standard of 
justice under the rule stated in § 165. However, in the absence of a specific agreement, 
an individual does not usually have standing to complain of such a violation before an 
international tribunal. Generally, it is the state of which he is a national that has the 
standing to bring the complaint. Moreover, the state of nationality may usually decide 
whether to exercise the right. For example, under the rule stated in § 73, a diplomatic 
representative is immune from the exercise of the jurisdiction of the state to which he is 
accredited. The state that he represents may, however, waive this immunity.  
 International law does not prohibit states from granting to individuals rights which 
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statement, the American Law Institute will recognize that the status of 
individuals has shifted in significant ways since the 1987 Restatement 
Third. In fact, the phenomena of globalization, cosmopolitanism, and 
transnationalism described only briefly herein (but much more thor-
oughly in other venues and by other authors) has largely come to be de-
scribed, analyzed, and understood only since 1987. 
Whether individuals are included by way of the interpretations and 
analysis of the most highly qualified publicists and scholars or by way 
of a textual revision, a second discussion is of paramount importance. 
What follows is a discussion of the sources of opinion-evidence that 
might be employed in determining what individuals have come to be-
lieve are their rights as a matter of CIL.  
                                                                                                                                      
they may enforce directly. See the Convention of December 20, 1907 for the Establish-
ment of a Central American Court of Justice, which provides that individuals may bring 
complaints in that court, whether or not the state of their nationality supports their 
claims. Doc. No. 12, G/9, 14 U.N. Conf. Int’l Org. Docs. 477 (1945), [1907] Foreign 
Rel. U.S. 697 (1910). And as indicated in § 2 below, a state may provide a remedy un-
der its domestic law to give effect to a rule of international law. Also, as indicated in § 
3(b), an individual or corporation may enter into an agreement with a foreign state by 
the terms of which disputes arising out of the agreement are to be decided according to 
principles of international law. 
Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 1 cmt. f, illus. 3 (1967). 
Restatement (Third) states: 
 In the past it was sometimes assumed that individuals and corporations, companies 
or other juridical persons created by the laws of a state, were not persons under (or sub-
jects of) international law. In principle, however, individuals and private juridical enti-
ties can have any status, capacity, rights, or duties given them by international law or 
agreement, and increasingly individuals and private entities have been accorded such 
aspects of personality in varying measures. For example, international law and numer-
ous international agreements now recognize human rights of individuals and sometimes 
give individuals remedies before international bodies. See § 703. Individuals may be 
held liable for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, or geno-
cide. Corporations frequently are vehicles through which rights under international eco-
nomic law are asserted. 
 Although individuals and corporations have some independent status as persons in 
international law, the principal relationships between individuals and international law 
still run through the state, and their place in international life depends largely on their 
status as nationals of states. Thus, the law of state responsibility for injury to aliens 
hinges upon the nationality of the person injured. See § 713. A state may regulate con-
duct by its nationals outside its territory. See § 402(2). The nationality of individuals and 
corporations is dealt within §§ 211-213. 
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States pt. II, introductory note 
(1987). 
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B. Elements of Custom Among Individuals 
This Article employs the terms “belief” and “expectation” in refer-
ring to that which would have to be measured if individuals are to be in-
cluded in determinations of CIL’s content. As mentioned previously, 
these terms are used tentatively, for the following reasons. 
When this Article uses the term expectation, it adopts a definition of 
expectation that captures what individuals have come to expect regard-
ing the ways in which the state or other entities ought to behave. The 
term expectation can, of course, have other meanings. For example, it 
might be said that, even if individuals have come to expect their protec-
tion from slavery, they may be citizens of a state that regularly over-
looks instances of slavery or slave conditions. There could be a distinc-
tion between what individuals have come to expect normatively (i.e., 
they have come to expect that they should be protected from slavery) 
and what they expect will be an accurate prediction of state behavior 
(i.e., they will not be protected from slavery and their state will not in-
vestigate or prosecute cases of alleged slavery). This distinction is es-
sential to understand if the term “expectation” is to be used for the pur-
pose of including individuals in CIL formation, as the normative 
expectation would be useful while the realistic expectation simply 
would reflect the behavior of the state and would, therefore, provide no 
additional information and thus would not be useful. 
“Belief” is used herein to mean something similar to the opinio juris 
element in the traditional CIL formulation. It is used to signify what in-
dividuals believe about how states and other entities (including their 
own selves) ought to behave as a matter of law. It is possible that the 
term opinio juris is the better term. The primary reasons for not using 
that term herein are to avoid confusion with the term “opino juris” as 
that term is used in the traditional state-based formulation of CIL and to 
avoid becoming immediately enmeshed in the debates and disagree-
ments over the term opinio juris that have occurred in the context of 
state-based CIL. 
It is also essential to note that it is likely necessary to include indi-
vidual practice as an element in CIL determinations. After all, custom 
arises from conduct and actual behavior as opposed to arising from be-
liefs or expectations alone, and practice is thus significant. Also, there 
may be a certain grace in an individual-based “practice + opinio juris” 
formulation which would mirror the state-based objective and subjective 
elements. What exactly would be included in practice in respect to indi-
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viduals and the required uniformity, universality, and duration of a prac-
tice surely all would be the subject of controversy, as they have been in 
the state-based formulation. 
It is not the objective of this Article to settle these questions; these 
debates will be important and surely will be prolonged. For this reason 
this Article deliberately thus far has avoided referring to individuals’ 
“practices.” 
The result is a hesitant use of the terms “belief” and “expectation” 
that likely will prove to be only provisional. The dissatisfaction or dis-
comfort readers may feel at the use of these terms may well be shared 
by the author, who looks forward to reactions and proposals for more 
fitting elements or measures of custom among individuals. 
C. Determining Public Opinion  
In determining CIL, courts have relied on “international agreements; 
domestic constitutions or legislation; executive orders, declarations or 
recognitions; draft conventions or codes; reports, resolutions or deci-
sions of international organizations; and even the testimony or affidavits 
of textwriters.”214 It is not required that every item on this list be in-
cluded in such determinations, nor that any one source or set of sources 
be given preference over the others. The difficulty of assessing state 
practice and the opinio juris of states necessitates flexibility in this re-
spect. 
In making determinations about the content of CIL, courts and com-
mentators attempting to assess public expectation similarly would do 
well to look at a number of sources. As in the states-only context, it is 
unlikely that every item discussed herein would be useful or necessary 
in every determination and it is also unlikely that any source or set of 
sources should consistently be given preference over the others. Rather, 
a rich array of potential sources of evidence would be necessary in order 
to allow for the “process of continuous interaction, of continuous de-
mand and response” among those engaged in the law formation proc-
ess.215 This Section will discuss the use of General Assembly Resolu-
                                                          
214. Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 92, at 70–72. Paust provides a lengthy 
set of footnotes detailing cases in which each of these sources have been relied upon.  
215. Credit for the concept of the call and response nature of CIL is granted to Myres 
McDougal. He described this call and response as a process which allows for the reciprocal toler-
ances that lead to the expectations that power will be exercised in some uniform pattern. See 
Myres McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 356, 357–58 (1955). 
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tions, NGOs, litigation, and public opinion polls of evidence about the 
beliefs and expectations of individuals in respect to human rights. 
1. General Assembly Resolutions 
Professor Paust has put forth a proposal of how public opinion might 
be assessed for the determination of custom.216 In his view, General As-
sembly resolutions are the most apt sources for the collection of evi-
dence about public opinion. He is not the first to take the view that the 
actions of the General Assembly are useful in any attempt to arrive at 
world public opinion.217 Professor Chen has referred to such resolutions 
as potentially “a new institutional mode by which the peoples of the 
world can clearly communicate expectations of authority and con-
trol.”218 While somewhat doubtful of such a utopian characterization of 
General Assembly resolutions, this Article agrees that such resolutions 
can be useful points of information. This position seems in keeping with 
the intent of the Restatement, which calls the evidentiary value of the 
resolutions of international organizations “variable.”219 Still, when reso-
lutions of universal organizations are “adopted by consensus or virtual 
unanimity”220 they ought to be given “substantial weight.”221 
Similar to, but distinct from, Paust or Chen, however, this Article 
takes the view that no one source of evidence as to world opinion ought 
to be granted a premier status. For as even Paust notes:  
[I]t might also be unrealistic to depend entirely on a General As-
sembly resolution to reflect relevant patterns of legal expectation. 
General Assembly resolutions reflect a one-state-one-vote system 
that can provide evidence of the legal expectations of humankind 
only if it is assumed that each state adequately represents its peo-
                                                          
216. Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 92, at 75–77. 
217. See, e.g., United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), 3 Trials of War Criminals Be-
fore the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1946-1949, 3, 979 
(1950) (“The General Assembly is not an international legislature, but it is the most authoritative 
organ in existence for the interpretation of world opinion. Its recognition of genocide as an inter-
national crime is persuasive evidence of the fact.”), quoted in Paust, Customary International 
Law, supra note 92, at 75 n.28. 
218. CHEN, supra note 85, at 364–65. 
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103 cmt. c 
(1987). The Statute of the ICJ does not mention such resolutions in its list of sources for evidence. 
This is largely believed to be due to the fact that the Statute was drafted before resolutions of in-
ternational bodies took on their current importance. Id. at § 103 cmt. c, Reporters’ Note 2. 
220. Id. at § 103 cmt. c. 
221. Id. This is the standard employed by the Restatement for use of the work of universal or-
ganizations as evidence of law. 
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ple and that somehow the actual vote reflects what would have 
been a weighted voting pattern based on population numbers.222  
Each resolution of the General Assembly, taken alone, is not suffi-
cient in determining what individuals have come to believe are their 
rights such that they should be recognized as CIL. It would be an odd 
result if it were otherwise, and any resolution of the General Assembly 
became CIL. Rather, a consistent and sustained pattern of General As-
sembly resolutions, showing some degree of consensus (if not uniform 
agreement), should be required. Professor Paust agrees with this propo-
sition: “When one can identify a series of such resolutions through time, 
one can also rightly assume that such preferences or expectations are 
relatively stable within a given period and if they are matched with gen-
erally conforming behavior, one has evidence of a relatively stable cus-
tomary norm.”223 
In its 1996 Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, the ICJ similarly stated: 
General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may 
sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circum-
stances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence 
of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish 
whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is 
necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; 
it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its 
normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the 
gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the establish-
ment of a new rule.224 
As stated previously, however, this Article is of the view that even 
when consistent over time, General Assembly resolutions taken alone 
may not be sufficient to establish that public opinion has coalesced into 
custom on a particular norm. While this view may be seen by some as 
overly conservative, it is consistent with the position and rationalization 
expressed in the Reporters’ Notes to Section 103 of the Restatement 
which points to specific examples in which General Assembly resolu-
tions that were widely adopted cannot be thought to have been forma-
tive of CIL, and also to examples in which less than unanimous resolu-
                                                          
222. Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 92, at 75. 
223. Id; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 103 cmt. c (1987). 
224. 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254–55, para. 70 (July 8). 
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tions may, despite the lack of unanimity, still be indicative of CIL if 
they were bolstered by other evidence.225 
2. Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society as Proxies 
for Individuals 
The proliferation of NGOs in all areas of human rights leads naturally 
to the suggestion that consulting the work or advice of NGOs would be 
a valuable and reasonable method by which to include individuals in the 
CIL formation process. Professor Gunning made a similar proposal 
when she argued that the important role NGOs play in international af-
fairs necessitates that they be included in the custom creation process, 
especially “[a]s these groups mobilize widespread support.”226 When 
Professor Gunning made her recommendation, she suggested that de-
termining which NGOs should be included in the custom creation proc-
ess could be done using procedures similar to those followed in the 
United Nations for granting NGOs consultative status.227 
Other authors, even those who might favor expanding the participants 
in the CIL formation process, have objected to this approach. For exam-
ple, Professor Mertus has made clear her skepticism about the ability of 
NGOs to represent people democratically, well, or accurately.228 Profes-
sor Charlsworth has also noted her skepticism of including NGOs in the 
CIL formation process, though on grounds that seem to apply equally 
well to state and non-state actors. Her objection is that including non-
state actors would have the effect of “generating weak norms on a wide-
variety of topics.”229 Indeed, there is a non-intuitive observation to be 
made in the space between the objections of Professors Mertus and 
Charlsworth. 
                                                          
225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103 Re-
porters’ Note 2 (1987). The examples provided in the first case include the General Assembly 
resolution which declared use of nuclear weapons a violation of international law that was imme-
diately challenged by the United States–an important power in such matters. G.A. Res. 1653 
(XVI), U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (Nov. 24, 1961); see also Oscar 
Schachter, The Crisis of Legitimation in the United Nations, 50 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT’L 
RET 3 (1981), cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 103 Reporters’ Note 2 (1987).  
226. Gunning, supra note 99, at 222. 
227. Id. at 230–34. 
228. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
229. Hilary Charlesworth, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law, 92 
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. Proc. 44, 45 (1998). 
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Professor Gunning’s well-meant proposal to certify a relatively small 
(though perhaps unpredictable) number of NGOs to serve in consulta-
tive roles for the purpose of CIL formation is unworkable. Limiting the 
universe of NGOs qualified to participate in providing information 
about individuals’ expectations and beliefs will raise questions almost 
immediately about the delineations between those NGOs certified as 
competent to provide information and those not certified as competent. 
Some questions may require the expertise of large, international NGOs 
while others may require the insights of smaller, domestic organiza-
tions. Some may require the advice of NGOs with expertise in a particu-
lar subject, while others may require a whole different knowledge base 
and approach. The exclusionary process of certification will and should 
give rise to the skepticism raised by Professor Mertus. Maintaining an 
open process, which allows for the participation of a wide base of civil 
society, is a better approach. This more open approach should satisfy 
the concerns raised by Professor Charlsworth as well. 
It should at no point be forgotten that the process in which individu-
als are to be included is one designed to assist in determinations of what 
constitutes CIL. In order to achieve the status of CIL, it must be shown 
that there is sufficient uniformity of views about a given norm, such that 
it can be said to have become custom. If there is not sufficient uniform-
ity, a norm cannot possibly be customary law.230 In order to employ 
NGOs as proxies for individuals, such that they can convey the expecta-
tions and beliefs of individuals, it is necessary to include many different 
kinds of NGOs, broadly defined. To do otherwise would run afoul of le-
gitimate and real concerns expressed by Spivak and others regarding the 
trend toward western hegemonic representation of people’s beliefs.231 A 
broad inclusion of civil society is the more advisable approach when 
opening and formalizing a path for bottom-up law making. 
Even with a broad view of these potential proxies for individuals, it is 
necessary to keep in mind that in many (if not most) cases, this ap-
                                                          
230. After all, such a norm may express the aspirations of many without having become cus-
tom.  
231. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988). Spivak’s 
essay warns that the subaltern are not a heterogeneous group. Thus, any assumption of solidarity 
among the subaltern will run into inevitable problems. First, it will create a new and deepened 
assumption that the subaltern are a singular collective group. Second, among the subaltern, it will 
create a dependence on western scholars to speak for them, rather than assuring routes to speak 
for themselves.  
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proach, taken alone, likely will not provide information sufficient to de-
termine the content of CIL. 
3. Empirical Data 
a. Human Rights Litigation 
This Article has discussed already the relatively recent232 ability of 
individuals to initiate litigation or other proceedings on the grounds that 
their human rights have been violated.233 Litigation of this nature can 
serve as a source of information about both the rights that individuals 
have come to believe are theirs and the rights which they expect to have 
protected, promoted, or enforced. 
The complaints and petitions received by international tribunals and 
national courts are valuable pools of information regarding the content 
of people’s expectations and beliefs. Such claims may be based in treaty 
or in custom and this variation, of course, may make clear analysis of 
the utility of such claims difficult at times. Nonetheless, empirical data 
about these claims will be valuable. Information regarding the content 
of these complaints, the norms being called into play, the number of 
complaints based on any particular norm, and the broad or narrow geo-
graphic origins of the claims can serve as very useful information from 
individuals regarding whether a given norm has attained the level of 
custom.234 
Some readers may feel concern about using litigation in this manner 
because they believe it could create a countermajoritarian difficulty 
within international law, in which adjudicators might cause an affront to 
democratic principles by invalidating the domestic law of given states. 
A full exploration of this issue is outside the scope of the current Arti-
cle. However, on initial impression, it is difficult to see how using com-
plaints and petitions as sources of information, if properly conducted, 
would by itself give rise to a countermajoritarian difficulty. 
                                                          
232. This ability is recent relative to the creation of the Statute of the ICJ and the era in which 
the object theory of the individual and the volunteerist principle in international law were para-
digmatically accepted.  
233. See supra Section III.A. 
234. The author has presented this idea previously, arguing that litigation under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act (ATCA) serves as an unusually “pure” source of such information, given that 
ATCA litigation must be based on a claim that the law of nations, or CIL, has been violated. See 
Ochoa, supra note 57, at 124. 
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This Article does not propose that a small number of petitioners or 
plaintiffs would, through their litigation, grant to a future adjudicator the 
power to declare a norm to have become CIL. Rather, precisely because 
the project before the adjudicator would be to determine if the norm has 
in fact become custom, only a relatively large number of claims, with 
broad geographic origins, expressing very similar views about the 
norms claimed by the petitioners or plaintiffs would serve as evidence 
that a particular norm may have become CIL. In the absence of these 
characteristics, litigation or petitions alone would be of only little value, 
and scholars or adjudicators making an analysis of the status of a norm 
in the public opinion would do well to look to other sources as well. 
b. Public Polling 
Disciplines outside of law have longer and deeper experience with 
the question of how to derive public opinion. Law is perhaps one of the 
least well-suited disciplines for deciphering public opinion, and in this 
way customary law is unique. Both the civil and common law ap-
proaches have divorced themselves from custom and are thus strongly 
rooted in deriving or devising rules and procedures and are not overtly 
swayed by popular opinion. The work of scholars in other disciplines on 
determining popular opinion is, and will be, essential in attempts to de-
termine whether public expectation and belief are such that a norm has 
become CIL. 
Since the Statute of the ICJ was drafted, the emergence and growth of 
the public opinion poll has been one of the greatest developments of re-
search into public opinion. The global spread of the internet has created 
a previously unthinkable ability to attain data on a broad number of top-
ics.235 This Article is by no means an attempt to encapsulate this history 
or the importance of this development. Rather, this Article discusses 
two very relevant examples of projects that illustrate the viability and 
potential utility of large scale polling for the purpose of assessing be-
liefs, expectations, and practices. 
                                                          
235. For a non-comprehensive list of internet-based polls and a very brief introduction to the 
internet as a tool for public polling, see Gary Thompson & Sean Conley, Internet Resources: 
Guide to Public Opinion Poll Web Sites: Polling Data from Around the World, C. & RES. LIBR. 
NEWS, Oct. 2006, available at 
http://www.ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlpubs/crlnews/backissues2006/october06/opinionpoll.htm; see also 
Yale University Library, Public Opinion Subject Guide, 
http://www.library.yale.edu/socsci/opinion/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).  
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A project called Eurobarometer has been in place since 1973. It is 
made up of a number of public opinion surveys performed regularly for 
use by the European Commission.236 The goal of Eurobarometer is to 
aid the European Commission in assessing “the evolution of public 
opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of texts, de-
cision-making and the evaluation of its work.”237 The surveys and stud-
ies “address major topics concerning European citizenship: enlarge-
ment, social situation, health, culture, information technology, 
environment, the Euro, defence, etc.”238 Among its projects, Euro-
barometer performs qualitative studies which “investigate in-depth the 
motivations, the feelings, and the reactions of selected social groups to-
wards a given subject or concept.”239 
Similarly, an international group of political scientists has founded a 
collaborative survey research project that measures public opinion on 
democracy in eighteen African countries.240 Through native language 
personal interviews with a broad cross-section of the population of a 
number of African countries, this group of political scientists has ar-
rived at groundbreaking data and has made accessible previously un-
known information about public sentiment.241 
There are similar barometer projects in Latin America,242 Asia,243 and 
East Asia.244 All of these “barometer” projects have collaborated and 
agreed to methodologies that will allow the various barometers to be 
compared with one another. This project is called Globalbarometer.245 
Although it does not appear that any of the barometer projects have 
taken on the role of attempting to directly assess public opinion in re-
                                                          
236. The European Commission Web site for Eurobarometer is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2007). 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. This project, called Afrobarometer, attempts to track public sentiment and changes 
therein over time. For information about this project and its methods, see Afrobarometer Africa 
Public Opinion Research, at http://www.afrobarometer.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).  
241. See MICHAEL BRATTON ET AL., PUBLIC OPINION, DEMOCRACY AND MARKET REFORM 
IN AFRICA (2005) (using the data collected through the Afrobarometer project to describe what 
large numbers of ordinary Africans believe and expect about democracy and market reform).  
242. See Latinobarómetro Opinion Pública Latinoamericana, 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/index.php?id=150 (last visited Apr. 22, 2007). 
243. See Asian Barometer, http://www.asianbarometer.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2007). 
244. See East Asia Barometer, http://eacsurvey.law.ntu.edu.tw (last visited Apr. 22, 2007). 
245. See Latinobarómetro Profile, http://www.latinobarometro.org/index.php?id=147 (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2007).  
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spect to CIL or even any given norm,246 the salience of these projects to 
the proposal contained herein is remarkable and bears further investiga-
tion. 
Of course, there are surely limitations with the use of public polls. 
The perils of the public poll and the manipulability of this tool should 
be kept readily in mind. The methodologies used, the populations stud-
ied or surveyed, the ability of poll results to provide insights about the 
texture and content of varying types of responses (rather than homoge-
nizing varying groups), and the survey questions themselves would have 
to be highly scrutinized any time public polls were used to make a claim 
about individuals’ beliefs and expectations. 
4. Other Potential Approaches 
This Section has provided four means by which evidence regarding 
the beliefs and expectations can be collected such that it could be em-
ployed in determinations of the content of CIL. Surely others exist, and 
the author looks forward with great interest to learning about them. 
CONCLUSION 
A concern readers may raise is that individuals’ beliefs and expecta-
tions are not currently measured or known. While this concern may be 
legitimate, readers should not make the mistake of believing that such 
beliefs and expectations are unknowable. Until now, little empirical re-
search has been conducted about the beliefs of individuals regarding 
their human rights. While there is something inherently troubling about 
this fact, it is understandable to some extent. After all, until now, only 
states have controlled the field of CIL formation. Thus, only state be-
havior and beliefs have been of concern.  
In 1949, shortly after the adoption of the Statute of the ICJ, the 
United Nations General Assembly’s International Law Commission 
commissioned a memorandum meant to assess the materials one might 
consult in attempting to determine the content of CIL.247 Submitted 
                                                          
246. The barometers are currently oriented toward determining public opinion with respect to 
issues of democracy and the market. The barometers thus indirectly provide information with re-
spect to human rights that are particularly relevant to civic participation such as freedom of 
speech and assembly. This could already be of use, for example, in attempts to determine the cus-
tomary or non-customary content of some civil and political rights. 
247. The Secretary-General, Ways and Means of Making the Evidence of Customary Interna-
tional Law More Readily Available, delivered to the General Assembly International Law Com-
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sixty years ago, it is a rudimentary report, listing the available docu-
ments produced by various states that could serve as sources of evi-
dence of the actions and opinio juris of states. The short list of potential 
sources of evidence for assessing the beliefs and expectations of indi-
viduals provided and discussed herein is even more rudimentary than 
this report, but it can serve as a starting point to larger discussions on 
how individuals can be included in CIL formation. 
Another potential misunderstanding that readers may have is that the 
participation of individuals in CIL formation would either dismiss or 
discount the centrality of states. It aims to do neither, as it does not in 
any way mean to suggest that states would not continue to play a vital 
role in CIL formation. Rather, it accepts that international law now per-
tains to many types of subjects, including states. Thus, to the extent the 
content of CIL bears on their interests and experience, and to the extent 
that it might obligate or protect them, states as well as individuals would 
play a role in the formation of CIL. 
Some may argue that the danger of this proposal is that it will add to 
the indeterminate nature of CIL. Perhaps it will be useful to readers at 
this point to be reminded of the imperfect nature of CIL determinations, 
even under traditional state-only doctrine. In seeking to make determi-
nations of the content of CIL, there are no systematic rules of procedure 
that must be meticulously followed. In making such determinations, 
courts or commentators may rely on a number of broad and diverse 
sources, without discussing the reasons for including some and not oth-
ers or the relative weight given to each. As Professor Byers has stated 
very concisely, even though the processes of CIL creation may be com-
plex and even ambiguous, this does not mean that the emerging rules 
are similarly indeterminate. In fact, “the legal rules which result from its 
operation are nevertheless very real, and have tangible results. Their 
normative value is not diminished by the possible indeterminacy of the 
arguments which may be used to establish their existence and con-
tent.”248 
This is important to remember because readers may feel uncomfort-
able with the proliferation of sources required by including individuals 
in CIL formation and the variety of methods presented herein for deter-
mining public opinion. They would do well to remember that the very 
nature of CIL determinations is indeterminate. This proposal would not 
                                                                                                                                      
mission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/6 (Mar. 7, 1949). 
248. BYERS, supra note 45, at 211. 
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muddy an otherwise clear and well-established methodology. This is not 
to say that it might not make CIL determinations slightly more complex. 
It may, and this is a serious and legitimate concern. It is at least argu-
able, however, that the risk and increased costs that might result are 
outweighed by the increased legitimacy brought to determinations of the 
content of CIL and, thereby, to CIL itself. 
 
